Re: Kim 2.4 - 2.5

```Hi John,
```
```
> I decided so many times not to reflect to the esoteric sci-fi
> assumptions (thought experiments?) on this list - about situations
> beyond common sense, their use as templates for consequences.

It is as you wish, but it is my way to question the humans, through UDA.
Then the number is my way to question the machine, through AUDA.

You seem to have a problem with thought experiences and with numbers,
which prevent you to follow both path.

Don't worry, because perhaps you have your own path and interest and I
know we agree on some fundamental issue.

The only thing which sometimes worries me is when it looks you are
sure that machine or number are dumb, which for me illustrates a
common human prejudice (the feeling superior ...)

> Now, however, I can't control my 'mouse' - in random and
> probabilistics.
> *
> Bruno quotes in  " -- "  lines, like the starting proposition:
> "It is because an event can be random or probabilistic..."
> *
> "...the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> experience with a probability "measure"
> HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2...."
>
> Wrong.
> A "PERFECT coin PERFECTLY thrown gives ALWAYS either HEAD or TAIL.
> It is those imperfections unobserved(?) that makes the difference in
> the outcome to 50-50. The only difference that really counts is the
> starting condition - whether it is thrown head or tail UP.

It seems to me that I agree with you. Let me give you my precise
definition of a perfect throw of a dice. You know, as Brent Meeker
recall nowadays there are magician which can "cheat" on those things
in extreme brilliant ways.
So I will accept that a thrown of coin is "perfect" (relatively to the
Probability 1/2) if the coin is enclosed in a velvet box and the box
is shaken during 5 days by 500 monkeys themselves taken randomly among
100000 monkeys, and this when God is not looking (to prevent God for
being the magician accomplice, who knows ...).

>
> To your subsequent 3 questions the answer is YES - depending how you
> identify 'probability'. (I don't).
> To your evaluating paragraph "Fair Enough": fair enough.
> That makes my point.
> *
> The "experiments with sleeping in the room with whiskey" are above
> my head (=my common sense). The Einstein conclusions show that even
> a big genius like him cannot cope with epistemic enrichment coming
> AFTER his time.

Einstein was alas still a bit brainwashed by Aristotle, imo. You know
that I think that the Platonists, and especially Plotinus, has well
coped with the epistemic enrichment coming after him, and I believe,
after us .... (Lewis Carroll too I think, actually).

And I would so much be pleased to let you guess that the little Lobian
machine can cope a so big epistemic enrichment too...

Theology has to come back in Academy, I think, if only we want some
human human science ... I'm afraid that  science has been interrupted
in 529.

The enlightnment period has only aggravated the gap between human
science and exact science. This could explain in part the inhuman mess
on the planet.

> (Which extends into the contemporary novelties as well?!)
>
> "...Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math" blindness
> perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested in
> computer science. ..."
>
> the level of asking resonable questions.

I admire too. Kim is courageous.
Well, for the tenacity we will see :)

> I could not spend so much time to submerge myself - and - maybe I am
> further away from your domain to do so.

My domain is theology. scientific and thus agnostic theology.  I
specialized my self in Machine's theology. Or Human's theology once
assuming comp. The UDA shows (or should show) that physics is a branch
of theology, so that the AUDA makes Machine's theology experimentally
refutable.

As a scientist I *know* nothing, but I can appreciate some theories.
Theories are always hypotheses, waiting to be changed or reinterpreted.

>
> Thanks for the (*) added post scriptum, I missed it so far.
>
> One word of how I feel about probability:
> In the conventional (scientific/math) view we consider model domains
> for our observation (interest). Within such domain we 'count' the
> item in question (that is statistical) irrespective of occurrences
> beyond the boundaries of that domain. The "next" occurrence in the
> future history is undecided from a knowledge of the domain's past
> history in our best effort: we can consider only the 'stuff' limited
> into our model, cannot include effects from 'the rest of the world',
> so we cannot tell a 'probability' of the 'next' occurrence at all.
> Ominscient is different. I am not.

I am not sure I understand, given that "probability" is a measure of
our ignorance (from us to God, depending on the domain indeed).
In deterministic theories like comp or Everett QM (the Many-World),
all computable probabilities reflect an ignorance of a subject. With
Omniscience probabilities are 0 or 1, it seems to me. Well, it depends
at which level we look at, and through which notion of person we make
the observation, also.

>
> Thanks for an interesting reading.

*I* thank you for your kind attention,

Best,

Bruno

>
>
> On Mon, Jan 5, 2009 at 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> wrote:
>
>
> On 03 Jan 2009, at 12:59, Kim Jones wrote:
> >
> > Bruno,
> >
> > In this step, one of me experiences (or actually does not
> experience)
> > the delay prior to reconstitution. In Step 2, it was proven to me
> that
> > I cannot know that any extra time (other than the 4 minutes
> necessary
> > transmission interval) has elapsed between my annihilation and
> > reconstitution on Mars. The same thing will now happen to one of
> "me"
> > in the duplication-plus-delay in Step 4. Essentially, Step 4 is
> > identical to Step 2 with duplication as the only added feature. We
> > cannot attribute a measure to my 1-pov in either step because the
> > outcome is truly random.
>
> It is because an event can be random or probabilistic that we have to
> put a measure on it (like a distribution of probabilities, or of
> credibilities).
>
> Example: the perfect throwing of the perfect coin gives an random
> experience with a probability "measure" HEAD = 1/2, TAIL = 1/2.
>
> I will ask you questions, if you don't mind. I prefer to ask question
> and illustrate the use of the word in place of teaching you the
> probability theory.
>
> - Do you agree that if you throw a coin, you have a probability of 1/2
> - Do you agree that if you throw a dice, you have a probability of 1/6
> to get "six"?
> - Do you agree that if you play lottery, you will win the biggest
> price with a probability like 1/<big number>
>
> In most discrete case, we can infer equivalence of the elementary
> events on the base of symmetry (like in the old Pascal probability
> calculus).
> >
> > Here I would merely like to ask, random to whom?
>
> Fair enough. In all situation which will interest us: it means
> "random for the subject who performs the (first person) experience".
> You are the one throwing the dice? Then it will be random for you
> (despite it will be random for your friend too, but perhaps not for
> God).
>
> > Doesn't random mean  that no conscious mind (mine or >yours) can
> see the determinism behind it?
>
> I could agree, although it is not necessary to dig on such detailed
> analysis, imo.
>
> > We are tempted to say "probability 1/2" but that is only >a comp-
> style "bet".
>
> I am not sure I understand. There is just one comp bet: the "yes
> doctor", which we can be paraphrased in step 1by "I survive (or I go
> to Mars) with probability 1". (and idem in step 2)
> But in step 3, ASSUMING comp, it is hard for me to see any
> difference with the throwing of a coin, *for the subject of the
> experience*.
>
> Suppose I propose the following two type of experiences/experiments.
> The ROOM ZERO and the ROOM ONE are NOT distinguishable from inside
> (but are of course distinguishable from outside). In particular, to
> make things 100% clear later, i add in both room a close box with a
> bottle of whisky inside. And you know this fact about the rooms.
>
> Type 1 experience: I make you asleep, then I throw a coin, if the
> outcome is HEAD I put you in the ROOM ZERO, if I get TAIL, I put you
> in the ROOM ONE. In the room, I wake you up, and I ask you to evaluate
> the chance of finding whisky in the box, and then the chance
> (probability) of being in room ZERO.
>
> Type 2 experience: I make you asleep, then I scan you and annihilate
> you, and I reconstitute you in both rooms ZERO and ONE.  I wake you
> up in both room. In both rooms, you have to evaluate the chance
> (probability) of being in room ZERO or ONE,  and the chance of
> finding whisky in the box.
>
>  From the first person points of view, sequences of such experience
> will seem equivalent, except for the "Harry Potter" or "white
> rabbit" youS, which will believe in special computable sequences. OK?
>
> Now the question can be asked BEFORE you undergo the experience. You
> can predict you will have whisky with probability 1.
>
> So you can predict that you will NOT know in which room you are with
> probability one. So you can predict with certainty that you *will
> be* uncertain of which room you are. So you are now not knowing in
> which room you will
> be. So the 1/2 can be lifted in your past. You could not have known!
> (This I sum up by the drawing: Y = II, bifurcation of "futures"
> differentiates the "pasts")
>
> > You explained on this in Step 2:
> >
> >
> > "We see that the MEC hypothesis, generally considered as imposing a
> > strong determinacy in nature, introduces on the contrary a form of
> > strong indeterminacy. Even a God, or whatever possible Omniscient
> > Being, cannot predict to you, before a duplication (of you)
> > experiment, where you will feel to be after. If he told you "you
> will
> > feel to be the one in room A", the "Kim" in room A will say that
> such
> > God was right, but the one in room B will know or believe that that
> > God was wrong, and the point of MEC is that we have no reason to
> > listen more to one Kim than to the other Kim. In particular the
> Kim of
> > room A will not convince the Kim of room B, that "God" was right. No
> > Kim will ever be able to convince its counterpart about any possible
> > method of prediction for the particular future.
> >
> >
> > I want to grok this more. At this stage I can only believe you.
>
>
> No, please, you should'nt. Hope the explanation above has clarified.
>
> > I have  always felt (with Einstein) that reality is >fundamentally
> deterministic, even if we have to point to >stochastic features
> along  the way.
>
> I follow Einstein. Like the Everettian. Everett provide an
> interpretation of QM where reality is fundamentally deterministic,
> yet, shows that the deterministic main equation of QM, SWE, explains
> why observers, from their point of view, met indeterminacies, and
> how they can put measure on them and do the usual quantum probability
> calculus. In a nutshell: the observation of a quantum superposition
> is seen as a self-duplication experience, or a differentiation of a
> history.
>
> > I know you will be able to debunk this easily and  to my >(and
> Einstein's) satisfaction.
>
>  From what Einstein said in the EPR paper, and from the extreme
> confirmation of QM which has continued, I would think that Einstein
> would have adopted Everett, and then eventually comp. It is the same
> philosophy. Einstein missed comp by its "conventionalist math"
> blindness perhaps, togethet with the fact that he was not interested
> in computer science.
>
> > Maybe dwell a little on this
>
> OK. Tell me if you get the point of above. Throwing a coin, and self-
> duplication are identical first person experiences.
> You have to really do the thought experiences.
> If I duplicate you in room 1 and 2, with repetition (iteratively), you
> could predict that you will be the one with the diary 111111111...,
> But all your doppelganger (the 1011100010..., the 0000000...) will
> know they were wrong. The "111111111..." *is* the first person white
> rabbit experience, that we should not, in this protocol, take into
> account.
>
>
>
> > and then move
> > on to Step 5 where you manage to email me to me.
>
>
> Hmmm... It is just a teleportation without annihilation of the
> original. I scan you on earth, and then I send the info on Mars where
> you are reconstituted. the question is what is the probability that
> you will find yourself on Mars, what is the probability you stay on
> Earth. from you first person point of view you will not live both. OK?
> It is really a duplication, with a zero delay on one of its branch.
>
>
>
>
> > This is truly scary
> > because here I meet "myself". I recall with horror what Angier did
> > about his double in "The Prestige"...
> >
> > Actually, I believe I have already met my double.
>
>
> Well, yes, you should already in step 3 ! In all duplication you can
> meet your doppelganger. It is the main relationship between the
> prestige and comp: self-duplication. It is the key basic construction
> of the UDA and AUDA. I got all this by looking at amoeba, paramecium,
> Euglena, and even Bacteria. I am inspired by "real" biology at the
> start. I have discovered computer science in the jacob and Monod paper
> on the Operon Lactose (a genetic sugar regulation system in the
> bacteria Escherichia Coli). My first models of self-replication where
> carbon based until i discover Gödel's proof which makes me suspect
> that carbon has nothing to do with the key life principles.
>
>
>
>
> > Once, a man stopped
> > outside my house and stroked my cat, which was on the verandah. I
> > greeted him and he told me that he had a cat that looked exactly
> like
> > my cat and that it was his dearest and most cherished friend (I feel
> > much the same way about my cat). I then asked him what name he had
> > given his cat. He told me "Cindy Bingy". I think my mouth must have
> > fallen open in shock because that is the name of my cat too. From
> > memory, the man looked rather like me as well. He then walked off
> > while I stood there wondering about the improbability of all this (I
> > cannot remember whether cannabis was in my system at the time)
>
>
> So I will not try to interpret this :)
>
> Tell me if you agree that self-duplication entails, from the first
> point of view of the person(s) a feeling of uncertainty on their first
> person future, and, when knowing the protocol, some means to evaluate
> their chance. I can use other thought experiences, like with the movie
> which I can explain in more details (perhaps the number
> 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24 of KIM 2.3 is not easy for you(*).
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
> (*) I repeat there (quote from my post to Abram and you: KIM 2.3:
>
>  don't want to give a definition of what is a normal machine, just
> that you feel the point.
>
> Let me give you another illustration which exploits the freedom of
> thought a bit more. Indeed, let me duplicate you, or better,
> polyplicate you into 2^(16180*10000)*(60*90)*24.
>
> I explain. I multiply you by 2^(16180*10000) in front of a
> (16180*10000) pixels screen, with each possible images (black and
> white) on it.
> And I reiterate every 1/24 of a second that multiplication, and this
> during 90 minutes, that is 90*60 seconds.
>
> What do you predict you will feel, as personal, subjective, first
> person experience. What do you think is more probable, among:
> I will feel seeing a white screen
> I will feel seeing a black screen
> I will feel seeing a movie
> I will feel seeing a good movie
> I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey"
> I will feel seeing "2001 Space Odyssey" with the subtitle of Caligula
> I will feel seeing a random-noise-movie (what you see on TV when there
> is no emission).
>
> Of course there is a sense to say: I will see all possible movies,
> but this means you are talking about yourself at the third person
> point of view, and here what is asked, is what do you expect to
> experience or live in your future if you are invited to practice it.
> By MEC, you survive, and any of your first person experience is
> unique, on which
> of the above you would bet? What bet will you do if I tell you that
> I will accompany you in the multiplication. And send you to hell if
> your bet is wrong. What bet you will do if you want to optimize the
> chance of not going to hell?
>
> The rest of the UDA reasoning shows that "this" thought experience
> happens all the time in arithmetic, but the "probabilities", which
> eventually could be credibilities or other uncertainty measure, are
> constrained by computer science/number theory. It extends the notion
> of normality from the protocol above to the whole Universal
> Deployment (which I will (re)define in KIM 3).
>
> Exercise: define the notion of "normal first person experience" for
> machine in the protocol above. With the UD protocol, things are so
> much complex that I will interview the Universal Machine directly to
> provide hints ...
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
> >

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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