On 02 Feb 2009, at 18:20, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 31 Jan 2009, at 12:47, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> Ok then for the particular run I describe, the two programs (the
>>> original and the one modified by stub subpart) have the same
>>> So for this particular run, we should still accept that the stub
>>> modified program is conscious while the run is performed (either
>>> physicaly or just by the mere existence of it's trace in platonia).
>> It is more complex than that. I have to think more to make a genuine
>>> Is consciousness supervening on the state/trace of the computation
>>> (which makes that there is an infinity of computations "outputing"
>>> this trace, and in our case original program and stub program does
>>> same) or on the trace+the relation between states (which would
>>> differentiate the two programs, hence by what supervening mean the
>>> consciousness generated by them) ?
>> On the trace+relations, or better on the relations only. But the
>> relations are infinitely many too.
> I don't understand the last remark. We're assuming the computation
> is performed
> by some finite-state machine - right? In which case successive
> states are
> related by a "successor function" which is a finite set of triples.
Consciousness is a *first* person notion. We have abandoned the
physical supervenience, and we associate (by UDA and/or comp
supervenience) consciousness to *all* computations going through our
state, if only for betting the "correct" measure. Each particular
computations generated in the universal deployment can indeed be
related to a successor function, but, assuming comp, *you* (first
person) belong to an infinity of computations. Your consciousness is
related to an instinctive bet that there is a universal machine
supporting your computations, but your probable next state is
determined by an infinity of universal machines and computational
histories, in particular, those histories appearing below your
substitution level. OK? Cf the seventh step.
I do with comp, what some people do with QM, I take it being literally
true. It is the only way to discover, perhaps, that the hypothesis is
Consciousness, personal and less personal, like all the immaterial
relations between numbers, is in Platonia. Brains and bodies are
relative objects which makes that consciousness able to manifest
itself relatively to normal and most probable computational histories.
Comp, like QM, is less and less intuitive the more you grasp it: the
big picture *is* counter-intuitive. Indeed the whole big picture is
just necessarily not graspable. But then the machine can prove that it
has to be so once the machine assumes comp and bet on its own soundness.
Of course you have to keep distinct this intrinsic non intelligibility
and the contradiction you can come to when you forget the difference
between third person views and first person views.
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