2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

>  From a logical point of view Shoemaker is right. You can say "no" for
> many reasons to the doctor.
> The copy will not even behave as you.
> The copy will behave like you, but is a phi-zombie.
> The copy behaves like you and as a soul/personality/consciousness, but
> yet is not you (and you are dead)

This last is the problematic one. If it is valid, then it is also
valid to say that I only live for a moment and continuity of identity
is only an illusion. Actually, I have no objection to this way of
speaking, but we would then just have to say that this illusion of
continuity is just as good as what we hitherto thought was real

> The copy is you (in Parfit sense: that it is as better than you).
> And,
> the copy can be you in deeper and deeper senses (roughly speaking up
> to the unspeakable "you = ONE").
> I talk here on the first person "you". It is infinite and unnameable.
> Here computer science can makes those term (like "unnameable") much
> more precise.

I don't see how the copy could be me in a deeper sense than having all
my thoughts, memories etc. It would be like saying that if I wave my
magic wand over you you will become specially blessed, even though
nothing will actually change either subjectively or objectively.

Stathis Papaioannou

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