Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/2/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>
>
>
>     The copy could be you in the deeper sense that it could be you even in
>     the case where he loses some memory, all memories, or in case he got
>     new memories, including false souvenirs. But then it is like in the
>     movie "the prestige", your brother can be you. This path leads to the
>     idea that we are already all the same person. It is "not being the
>     other" which is an illusion in that case. I don't insist on this
>     because we don't need to see that arithmetic is the theory of
>     everything (and that physics comes from there). But it is needed for
>     the "other hypostases" and the whole theological point.
>
>     Bruno
>
>
>     http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>     <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>
>
> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you 
> mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and 
> render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>
> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what 
> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in 
> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I 
> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of 
personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like 
"observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not 
being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a 
time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously 
recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be 
essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask, 
"Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"

Brent

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to