Stephen Paul King wrote:
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Brent Meeker" <>
> To: <>
> Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 11:51 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A 
> Brief Introduction]
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> If the "copy" has no memory of being me then It's not me... or you
>>> mean there is something which is not memory but which is "me" (and
>>> render memory useless as primary property of the self) ?
>>> It is a matter of semantic but if you accept that memory is not what
>>> can be ascribe to "you" then "you/I/..." doesn't mean anything... in
>>> that sense you are me and vice-versa, and everyone is everyone but I
>>> don't see this as a theory of self identity.
>>> Regards,
>>> Quentin
>> I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
>> personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
>> "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
>> being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
>> time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
>> recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
>> essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
>> "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>> Brent
> Hi Brent and Quentin,
>     Could it be that it is the continuous possibility of recall from memory 
> itself and not just the occasional recall acts that are important to 
> continuity of P.I.?
> Stephen 
Sure.  But what provides that possibility - the causal (physical) 
continuity of the brain and body.


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