Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/2/25 meekerdb <>:
>> It is the potential "fusion" that bothers me.  It would seem to imply that
>> after Stathis and I have a simultaneous moment of thinking of nothing our
>> "closest continuations" might be mixtures, each having some memories
>> belonging to Stathis and some belonging to me.  But this doesn't seem to
>> occur - which we easily explain in terms of the causal continuity of the
>> brain.
> I don't see why periods of shared consciousness should result in
> fusion. Suppose S and B experience 3 consecutive minutes of
> consciousness, S1-S2-S3 and B1-B2-B3. The first and third minutes are
> distinct, but the second minute consists of staring at a blank wall
> with only minimal self-awareness and has identical subjective content
> in each case. What this means is that S2 and B2 are interchangeable,
> and when S3 or B3 is recalling the previous minute, it doesn't make
> sense to sense to say he definitely experienced S2 or B2 respectively.
> In other words, it would make no difference to the stream of
> consciousness of either S or B if one or other of S2 or B2 did not
> occur. And yet, even though S2 and B2 could be one and the same, there
> is no fusion of of consciousness, since B1, B3, S1 and S3 are all
> distinct.
If they are all distinct, then in what sense does S1-S2-S3 form a stream 
of consciousness, rather than S1-S2-B3 or even S1-B1-S3-B2.  Supposedly 
it is that S3 includes some memory of S1 (or earlier Si), but in that 
case why couldn't B3 also include some memory of both S1 and B1?  Why 
wouldn't that be as close a continuation as B3 containing only B1 memories?


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