2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
> Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one minute ago? I
> will be dead too? Less dead?
This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at