On 15 May 2009, at 14:25, ronaldheld wrote:
> I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here.
> I have problems with infinite time and resources for your
> computations, if done in this physical Universe.
Sure. Note that I use unbounded physical resources only in the step
seven, to make the argument smoother, but the step 8 eliminates the
need of that assumption. All you have to believe in is that a
mathematical Turing machine either stop or not stop.
> On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote:
>>> Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can
>> UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it
>> would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a
>> of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA
>> the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004
>> In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are
>> duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal
>> memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they
>> cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self-
>> duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation"
>> a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time".
>> So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal
>> with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la
>> Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person
>> indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all
>> the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to
>> remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state,
>> from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational
>> history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to
>> believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree
>> to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the
>> Y =
>> II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their
>> similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the
>> cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is
>> 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person
>> distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite
>> part of that enumeration. "Stable consciousness" need deep stories
>> (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a
>> notion of linear multiplication of independent stories.
>> Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can,
>> OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of
>> mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein
>> & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey).
>> Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA,
>> which shows that form their first point of view universal machine
>> cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish
>> "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm
>> defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal
>> machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual
>> mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a
>> weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis.
>> If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any
>> questions, or find a flaw etc.
>> (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page)
>> Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well
>> knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and
>> the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now).
>> Hope this helped a bit.
>>> On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the
>>>> "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata.
>>>> are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the
>>>> mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge
>>>> toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened)
>>>> But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that,
>>>> where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very
>>>> Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical
>>>> among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all
>>>> mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much
>>>> fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of
>>>> mechanical laws.
>>>> Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body
>>>> and still use an identity relation between a mind and a
>>>> of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank.
>>>> This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and
>>>> may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies
>>>> problems. Sure.
>>>> On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote:
>>>>> Hi Bruno,
>>>>> Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent
>>>>> article out in Complexity:
>>>>> (Complexity, 14, 40-46)
>>>>> It basically explores the organisational properties of the
>>>>> prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure
>>>>> way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent
>>>>> properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a
>>>>> earlier one that is not behind a paywall:
>>>>> I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in
>>>>> about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's
>>>>> is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who
>>>>> him a genius.
>>>>> It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme
>>>>> is to
>>>>> yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint
>>>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>>>>> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>>>>> Australia http://
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text -
>>>> - Show quoted text -
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text -
>> - Show quoted text -
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