Hi Ronald,

## Advertising

On 15 May 2009, at 14:25, ronaldheld wrote: > > Bruno: > I will wait for your most recent UDA to be posted here. All right. > > I have problems with infinite time and resources for your > computations, if done in this physical Universe. Sure. Note that I use unbounded physical resources only in the step seven, to make the argument smoother, but the step 8 eliminates the need of that assumption. All you have to believe in is that a mathematical Turing machine either stop or not stop. Best, Bruno > > > > On May 14, 12:22 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> Ronald, >> >> On 14 May 2009, at 13:19, Ronald (ronaldheld) wrote: >> >>> Can you explain your Physics statement in more detail, which I can >>> understand? >> >> UDA *is* the detailed explanation of that "physics statement". So it >> would be simpler if you could tell me at which step you have a >> problem >> of understanding, or an objection, or something. You can search UDA >> in >> the archives for older or more recent versions, or read my SANE2004 >> paper: >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/ >> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract... >> >> In a nutshell, the idea is the following. If we are machine we are >> duplicable. If we distinguish the first person by their personal >> memories, sufficiently introspective machine can deduce that they >> cannot predict with certainty they personal future in either self- >> duplicating experience, or in "many-identical-states preparation" >> like >> a concrete universal dovetailer would do "all the time". >> So, if you are concretely in front of a concrete universal >> dovetailer, >> with the guaranty it will never stop (in some steady universe à-la >> Hoyle for example), you are in a high state of first person >> indeterminacy, given that the universal dovetailer will execute all >> the computations going through your actual state. Sometimes I have to >> remind the step 5 for helping the understanding here. In that state, >> from a first person perspective you don't know in which computational >> history you belong, but you can believe (as far as you are willing to >> believe in comp) that there are infinitely many of them. If you agree >> to identify an history by its infinite steps, or if you accept the >> Y = >> II principle (that if a story bifurcate," Y ", you multiply their >> similar comp-past, so Y gives II), then you can understand that the >> cardinal (number) of your histories going through you actual state is >> 2^aleph_zero. It is a continuum. Of course you can first person >> distinguish only a enumerable quotient of it, and even just a finite >> part of that enumeration. "Stable consciousness" need deep stories >> (very long yet redundant stories, it is deep in Bennett sense) and a >> notion of linear multiplication of independent stories. >> Now the laws of arithmetic provides exactly this, and so you can, >> with >> OCCAM just jump to AUDA, but you have to study one or two book of >> mathematical logic and computer science before. (the best are Epstein >> & Carnielli, or Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey). >> Or, much easier, but not so easy, meditate on the eighth step of UDA, >> which shows that form their first point of view universal machine >> cannot distinguish "real" from "virtual", but they cannot distinguish >> "real" from "arithmetical" either, so that the arithmetical realm >> defines the intrinsic first person indeterminacy of any universal >> machine. Actually the eighth step shows that comp falsifies the usual >> mind/physical-machine identity thesis, but it does not falsify a >> weaker mind/many-mathematical machines thesis. >> >> If interested I suggest you study UDA in Sane2004, and ask any >> questions, or find a flaw etc. >> (or wait for a more recent version I have yet to put on my page) >> >> Thanks for the reference to Kent's paper (it illustrates very well >> the >> knotty problems you get into when you keep Everett, materialism and >> the identity thesis, but I have read it only diagonally just now). >> >> Hope this helped a bit. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On May 13, 11:30 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> Thanks Russell, I will take a look. At first sight he makes the >>>> same >>>> "error" with numbers that Wolfram makes with cellular automata. >>>> Those >>>> are still mathematical form of physicalism, incompatible with the >>>> mechanist thesis in the cognitive science. Of course we converge >>>> toward rather similar (recursively isomorphic or weakened) >>>> ontologies. >>>> But they seems to believe they can recover some physics from that, >>>> where, saying "yes" to the surgeon requires to abandon that very >>>> idea. >>>> Physics, like in Plato and Plotinus, is not a mathematical >>>> structure >>>> among others, it is a mathematical structure which relate all >>>> mathematical structures in a precise way. Physics is somehow much >>>> more >>>> fundamental than being a thing completely describable by a set of >>>> mechanical laws. >>>> Pu in another way, such theories are unaware of the mind-body >>>> problem >>>> and still use an identity relation between a mind and a >>>> implementation >>>> of a program which UDA forces to abandon, to be frank. >>>> This does not mean those works are uninteresting of course, and >>>> they >>>> may play some role in the unravelling of the Minds and Bodies >>>> problems. Sure. >> >>>> Bruno >> >>>> On 13 May 2009, at 01:15, russell standish wrote: >> >>>>> Hi Bruno, >> >>>>> Have you come across Victor Korotkikh's stuff? He's got a recent >>>>> article out in Complexity: >> >>>>> http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/121426751/abstract?CRETRY= >>>>> ... >> >>>>> (Complexity, 14, 40-46) >> >>>>> It basically explores the organisational properties of the >>>>> integers, >>>>> prime numbers etc. Which is kind of interesting in a pure >>>>> mathematical >>>>> way, but he then uses this to model real complex systems, emergent >>>>> properties and so on. If you can't get the above paper, here is a >>>>> much >>>>> earlier one that is not behind a paywall: >>>>> http://www.complexity.org.au/ci/vol03/victor2/ >> >>>>> I've met him a few times over the years - he's based in >>>>> Townsville, >>>>> about 2000km north of here. He's an intense Russian who's >>>>> presentation >>>>> is almost impenetrable - but there are people I respect who >>>>> consider >>>>> him a genius. >> >>>>> It struck me this morning how similar in many ways his programme >>>>> is to >>>>> yours. I suppose you both share a strong neo-platonic viewpoint >>>>> for >>>>> starters. >> >>>>> Cheers >> >>>>> -- >> >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> - >>>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>>> Mathematics >>>>> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au >>>>> Australia http:// >>>>> www.hpcoders.com.au >>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> - >> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/-Hide quoted text - >> >>>> - Show quoted text - >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - >> >> - Show quoted text - > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---