2009/7/17 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > You are correct about truth and provability. You may have insisted a bit > more on the first person/third person important , and still unsolved, to be > sure, relationship, and the first person indeterminacy which follows. You > certainly motivate me to explain better AUDA and its relation with UDA. > I am glad that Marty enjoy your post. At the same time, the point of my work > did consist in making this utterly clear (if not shocking for those > Aristotelian fundamentalist). Clarity in an hot field has to be technical or > it looks too much provocative. > Thanks for this very clear post. You have a good intuition of the ultimate > consequences of the comp hyp, I think.
Bruno, many thanks for your helpful commentary on my post - many of your points are well taken and will help me amplify and clarify my views. I'm just off for a long weekend in Oxford, but I'll muse further and try to respond on some of your points on my return mid-week. David > Hi David, > I comment your post with an apology to Kim and Marty, then I make a comment > to Marty, and then I comment your (very nice) post. > > Kim, Marty, I apologize for my bad sense of humor. Rereading some post, I > realize some nuance in the tone does not go through mailings. Please indulge > professional deformation of an old math teacher ... > On 17 Jul 2009, at 03:12, m.a. wrote: > > David, > I appreciated this post because I'm more interested in the > philosophical implications (which I'm hoping to find at the end of Bruno's > UDA bridge to Valhalla) of these goings-on ...than in the mathematical > ones. Best, > > > Marty, I can understand you. At the same time, many discussion have been > more philosophical, and the problem here, is that without some amount of > math, and of computer science, things will look like a crackpot-like thing. > It is almost in the nature of the subject. Big statements needs big > arguments, and at least enough precise pointers toward the real thing. > You can have a still more passive understanding of the UDA, if you > understand the first sixth steps. Then for the seventh, it is enough to > believe in the existence of universal dovetailer (itself a quasi direct > consequence of the existence of a universal machine). > Then the 8th step alone can help you to have an idea why the Universal > dovetailer is immaterial, so that physics has to be reduced to math and > "machine psuchology/theology". > But then, I will not been able to answer some remark which have been done by > Stathis, Russell, Brent and some others, and which are relalted to the > difference between a computation (be it mathematical or physical) and a > description of a computation (be it mathematical or physical), and this is > the key for understanding that when we assume brain are digitalizable, > eventually we have to abandon the idea that consciousness supervene on > physical computations, and to accept that it supervenes on mathematical > computations. > You know, the discovery of the universal machine is the real (creative) bomb > here. I could say that "nature" has never stopped to invent it and reinvent > it, like with the apparition of brain, of life and the possible other many > big bangs. > Then, it is hard to explain, without learning a bit on numbers, functions, > sets and mathematical structures, that arithmetic, simple elementary > arithmetic, already describes that universal thing which can't help itself > to reinvent hitself again and again and again, and this in an atemporal, > aspatial frames. > Sri Aurobindo made once a nice summary: > What, you ask, was the beginning of it all? > And it is this ... > Existence that multiplied itself > For sheer delight of being > And plunged into numberless trillions of forms > So that it might > Find > Itself > Innumerably > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "David Nyman" <david.ny...@gmail.com> > To: <firstname.lastname@example.org> > Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:38 PM > Subject: Dreams and Machines > > > > With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though > constantly dodged) task > > Well said! > > > of working towards an elementary grasp of the > technical underpinnings of COMP, and patently lacking the fortitude of > these valorous Stakhanovites, I have been spending my time lurking, > reading and musing. My philosophical position on possible relations > between computation and mind has long (well before this list) been > that it would indeed require something like Bruno's reversal of the > 'normal' relationship between computation and physics, so that mind > could emerge in some at least comprehensible manner; certainly not - > per impossibile - in the ghostly shrouds of the 'deus ex machina' of > 'computational materialism'. Consequently, parallel to the strenuous > effort ongoing in the other thread, I have been wrapping my mind more > loosely around 'interpretations of COMP-mechanics' in order to attempt > a better personal grasp of what it might mean as a metaphysics. As > always, I need help, so here goes for starters. > > This points to another problem I have. The UDA, and probably even more the > AUDA, has deeply changed my "philosophy", up to a point where I think that > philosophy and metaphysics can be handled with the doubting attitude of the > (ideal) scientist, and that this attitude is a vaccine against the most > inhuman aspect of "human science". But then I have reason to suggest that > everything becomes far more clearer if we drop the expression "fundamental > science", philosophy", "metaphysics" (unless we use them in their original > greek senses) and come back to the expression "theology". If you want, > assuming comp, metaphysics becomes a theology, with its communicable and non > communicable parts. Assuming comp we can already listen to the course on > machine theology provided by the machines. > But then I know that I look over-provocative. > At the same time, I feel that this is important, because, I don't see how we > could ever win the war against authoritative arguments and fundamentalism of > all kinds without bringing back modesty (that is science) in that field. > When you grasp comp, you can understand that those scientist who pretend not > doing theology are those who take Aristotle theology for granted. (Actually > even a simplification of Aristotle. Aristotle was more Platonist than we > usually imagine). > > > > > > Bruno has sometimes remarked (if I'm not misrepresenting him) that > COMP introduces us to machines and their dreams and I find this > metaphor very cogent and suggestive. > > You don't misrepresent me ... too much. Just that dreams is no more really > use as a metaphor, but as a literal thing. It is a point of using digital > mechanism, and assuming it clearly, and not just a vague mechanist > intuition, which is already at play in all rationalist approach to inquiry. > If someone accept an artificial heart, he/she does not got a metaphor in > his/her thorax. It is the same for an artificial brain, and eventually for a > purely arithmetical one. > > > Certainly it seems to me that my > present state could coherently be characterised as a peculiarly > consistent dream - one that I nonetheless assume to be correlated > systematically with features of some otherwise unreachable > 'elsewhere'. > > So you are a critical realist. A "believer" in the large open minded sense. > Nice. > The key lesson of UDA here is that, although you are right to bet that your > present state belongs to a consistent dream, the 'truth' (a theorem in comp) > is that there is an infinity of consistent dreams matching your > observations, and there is a sense in which you (first person you) actually > belong to an infinity of them. It is the many dreams aspect of the comp > theory, partially confirmed by the quantum empirical MW observations. > > > > > In COMP, the 'mechanism and language of dreams' is > posited to be those elements of the number realm and its operators > that are deemed necessary to instantiate a 'universal TM' (i.e. one > that - assuming CT to be true - is capable of computing any computable > function). Given this point of departure, > > Well the point of departure is really that I can survive with an artificial > "physical" brain. And the result is that "physical" can no more be a > primitive notion, and that the physical appearance has to be explained from > the numbers, and indeed from their relative self-reference modalities. This > leads to the arithmetical 'hypostases'. > > > it follows that machines so > instantiated would be capable of implementing any computable 'dream' > whatsoever - including dreams instantiating yet further levels of > machines and their dreams. With an additional dovetailing assumption, > we find ourselves in a position to construct a sort of hyper-threaded > layer-cake of dreaming where, from any arbitrary level, recursively > nested dreams disappear towards infinity both 'upwards' and > 'downwards'. > > All right. Except that the dovetailing is not an additional assumption. The > dovetailing is already there, like the primes numbers are already there, > once you posit the sixth first axioms of (Robinson) arithmetic. Sorry for > being technical. > > > > As we 'drill down' into this gateau, we are looking for emergent > patterns of invariance representing the self-referential viewpoints of > layers of 'dreaming machines' - their experience and their 'external > reality'. > > It is good idea to put 'external reality' in quote. It is a very ambiguous > notion. It can be the simple pure third person provable relations among the > numbers, like it can be the first person plural emerging appearance of > multiverse(s). > And it can be something in between, all that can depend, or not, of our > substitution level, and of the meaning "we" can give to words "we", "our", > ... > Obviously we do share a long and rich history. > > The lowest level of recursion that any particular system of > dreaming requires for its instantiation is taken to constitute its > 'substitution level'. > > I guess that I agree with what you want to mean, but I would have said "the > highest level" level required, in the sense that there is no lowest level. > In case of doubt, the doctor can always bet on a lowest level of comp, just > to diminish the probability that his patient become a zombie. Of course in > practice this will cost more money. > > > > Since which layer of the cake this corresponds > to must be unknowable from the viewpoint of any level we currently > occupy, we ineluctably take a gamble if we say 'yes' to any doctor who > claims to know what he's about. BTW, on this topic, I would refer you > to an interesting analogy that I append as a footnote below. > > So, what can we take 'reality' (i.e. real, as you will recall, "in the > sense that I am real") to mean in this schema? We cannot know, but we > do want to say that it corresponds self-referentially - in some sense > - to the number realm, and that the true language of the dreaming > machines therefore corresponds - also in some self-referential sense - > to numbers and their inter-relations. This 'sense of correspondence' > can be defined in two ways: 'truth', which is taken to correspond > self-referentially to the unknowably 'real', and 'provability', which > is taken to correspond to what this reality can consistently claim, > express, or represent to itself. > > Good summary! > > > This is about as far as I've got, and broad as it is, it seems to > point more or less in the direction of a detailed research programme > such as Bruno has outlined. > > Well, here I disagree in the probably looking immodest claim of mine that > the research has already be done up to the sad point that now, only math and > physics remains. My initial goal, unless mistakes (fatal or not) has been > attained: now we know that the "comp theology" is science, in the Popper > sense that the "comp theology" has been shown refutable. > What would be nice is that the Z1* logics leads to new quantum tautologies > so that the digital quantum nature can be tested against the quantum > empirical one. > > > I can see that stipulations on 'reality' > such as universal computability make implicit claims that are > empirically falsifiable in principle, which is most encouraging. > > This is CT, and you are correct, that part of comp is also refutable. But > this we already have good reason to believe that nature will not, and cannot > really refute it, unless quantum mechanics is wrong in the large proportion. > Actually, I believe that Church thesis can be proved in higher order logic, > but this is a point I prefer to range out of the topic, because it is not > essential, and it can lead to confusions (and it needs even bigger > familiarity with mathematical computer science). > The yes doctor is highly more doubtable, and the main goal consisted in > showing that it leads to a refutable 'theology'. Indeed, like in Plotinus, > both the sharable and non sharable part of physics is completely determined > by that "theology". > > > > Also, this general approach seems to me to have striking resonances > with metaphysics such as Bohm's notions of implication and > explication, as well as MWI. > > You may develop. I like very much Bohm, because he is an honest inquirer. I > appreciate him as a respectable adversary. > To keep his materialist philosophy he honestly posit a non-comp assumption, > and he is not attracted at all by the MWI. But many of its intuition fit > nicely with the comp hyp, as we can see by taking computer science > seriously. Bohm, like many, has still a "pre-Godelian" conception of comp, > so to speak. Well I should perhaps reread him because I don't remember how > far he is a (weak) materialist. > > > Anyway - Bruno, I would be grateful as > ever - when you have a moment - if you would tell me which end of what > wrong stick I've got hold of this time. > > Very nice post, David. The only general but key point where I would like to > add precision, if not insistence, is that "metaphor" thing. Einstein would > not have been glad if people told him that energy is a good metaphor for > matter, when all his work consists in a coherent theory (= clear refutable > assumption) where the relations between matter and energy are described by > testable/refutable facts. The whole point of saying yes to the doctor, qua > computatio, is for helping the understanding that the comp assumption is not > metaphorical and that it leads to a theory which implies the reversal that > you are most correctly intuiting. > You are correct about truth and provability. You may have insisted a bit > more on the first person/third person important , and still unsolved, to be > sure, relationship, and the first person indeterminacy which follows. You > certainly motivate me to explain better AUDA and its relation with UDA. > I am glad that Marty enjoy your post. At the same time, the point of my work > did consist in making this utterly clear (if not shocking for those > Aristotelian fundamentalist). Clarity in an hot field has to be technical or > it looks too much provocative. > Thanks for this very clear post. You have a good intuition of the ultimate > consequences of the comp hyp, I think. > > > Footnote: > > http://www.getyourowndirt.com/ > > One day a group of scientists got together and decided that man had > come a long way and no longer needed God. So they picked one scientist > to go and tell Him that they were done with Him. The scientist walked > up to God and said, "God, we've decided that we no longer need you. > We're to the point that we can clone people and do many miraculous > things, so why don't you just go on and get lost." > > God listened very patiently and kindly to the man and after the > scientist was done talking, God said, "Very well, how about this, > let's say we have a man making contest." To which the scientist > replied, "OK, great!" But God added, "Now, we're going to do this just > like I did back in the old days with Adam." The scientist said, "Sure, > no problem" and bent down and grabbed himself a handful of dirt. God > just looked at him and said, "No, no, no. You go get your own dirt!" > > Cute simple story illustrating a key point that most forget. > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---