*Intentionality and Computationalism: A Diagonal Argument *
Laureano Luna Cabanero, Department of Philosophy, IES Francisco Marin, 
Siles, Spain, and Christopher G. Small, Department of Statistics and 
Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Canada

Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are 
computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to 
show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in 
the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient 
version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a 
diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show 
there exists a thought that cannot be a computation.

How good an argument it is I don't know ..... I am in the process of 
getting my hands on the paper.
Meanwhile, if any of you folks can get it sooner I'd be very interested.

BTW I have recently submitted my own refutation of COMP to a superficially resembles a more practical version of the 
above. Basically.....a computationalist-based artificial scientist 
cannot propose/debate, let alone test, computationalism as a 'law of 
nature'.  Confusing/self-referential but has teeth as an argument.

Q. How many times does it take for dogma X to be refuted before projects 
totally dependent on the truth of dogma X get their outcome 
projections/expectations reviewed?

colin hales

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