John, Is not the difference between human and non human a human illusion?
With Church Turing thesis we can suspect the existence of universal illusions. Bruno On 01 Aug 2009, at 21:52, John Mikes wrote: > David, > I thought you are facing the Scottish mountains for a relaxation and > instead here is a long - enjoyable- tirade about ideas which I try > to put below into a shorthand form by my vocabulary. But first a > plea to Mrs. N: > 'please, do keep David away from te computer for the time of the > Scottish tourism, as he suggested it, to get him a good > mountaineering relaxation what we all would luv if we just can > afford it....' > and now back to David: > > "causal accounts" are model-based originating choices in a view > reduced into the figment of a 'physical world' i.e. in a > conventional science lingo, so ingeniously formed over the > millennia. It is our perceived reality, with math, based on the most > pervasive (dominating?) principle, called physics, all - in the > ongoing "HUMAN" ways of our thinking. > > Everything exists what we 'think of' in our MIND (nonexistent? no > way, we think of that, too). There is nosuch thing as a '3rd > pers.explanation, it is a 1st pers. idea, interpreted by all the > "3rd persons" into their own (1st pers) "mindset"(?). > > Ontology is today's explanation of today's epistemic inventory. > A nice, reductionist philosophy. Not applicable for tomorrow's > discoveries. A 'physical realist' is a conventional scientist within > the given figments. This list tries to overstep such 'human' > limitations - falling repeatedly back into the faithful application > of it. > > As Brent asked: "Is the physics account of life incomplete or > wrong? Do you consider "life" to have been eliminated?" > > "eliminated" WHAT? I spent some braingrease to find out what many > (some?) of us agree upon as 'life' - no success. YET it does exist > even in Brent's mind (who is a very advanced thinking list-member). > (Robert Rosen identified life as his 'M&R' (Metabolism and Repair) > based on his (mathematical) biology ways. I may extend the domain > into 'ideation' and 'not-so-bio' domains, even into the stupidly > named "in-animates"). > > Our millennia-evolved human (reductionistic - conventional) views > are based on timely evolving observational skills what we call > "physical" - worldview, science, explanatory base etc. So no wonder > if everything is touching it. It is not 'more real' than anything we > could sweat out for explaining the unexplainable. > It all undergoes (ontological etc.) changes as epistemy grows. > I don't want to touch here the chicken-egg topic of "numbers", yet > this, too, is a HUMAN dilemma between Bruno and friends vs. David > Bohm. And we are figments within the totality, not the original > creators. We don't 'see' too far. > Somebody asked me: "How do we learn something that is aboslutely 'N > E W' ? I had no answer. I tried: by playing with unrelated > relationships - which is only manipulting the existent. > Even Star Trek relied on modified knowables as novelty, the absolute > new is not available to us - unless already having been hinted in > some corner of the totality as a 'findable' relation. The quality > from quantity Leninian principle may give a clue to it, if a large > enough background can be checked (cf. Bruno's words to get to > anything by using enough many numbers for it). Still such cop-outs > include my usual retort: applying the "somehow" > > Finally: COMP and reality? not this embryonic binary algorithm based > (physical) contraption, not even an advanced fantasy kind of similar > deficiencies can approach what we cannot: the unfathomable 'reality' > of them all. It is not a 'higher inventory', it (if there is such an > 'it' - I did not say: exists) is beyond anything we can imagine > humanly. We can speculate about reality's 'human' type aspects of > partial hints we can humanly approach and make a pars pro toto dream > of it - we are wrong for sure. > > Have a healthy mountain-climb in Scottland > > John M > > On Fri, Jul 31, 2009 at 5:39 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z, > and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am > real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain. > Hmm....... > > Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about > the validity of causal accounts of the first person based on a > functional or computational rationale. I'm going to make an attempt > to annihilate this intuition in this thread, and hope to encourage > feedback specifically on this issue. You will recall that this is at > the heart of Bruno's requirement to base COMP - i.e. the explicitly > computational account of mind - on the the number realm, with physics > derived as an emergent from this. Step 8 of the UDA addresses these > issues in a very particular way. > > However, I've always felt that there's a more intuitively obvious and > just as devastating blow that can be dealt to functional or > computational notions based on physical entities and relations > conceived as ontologically foundational and singular (i.e. no dualism > please). So as not to be misunderstood (too quickly!) let me make it > clear at the outset that I'm addressing this to first person conscious > experience, not to third person descriptions of 'mentality' - so > eliminativists can stop reading at this point as there is nothing > further that requires explanation in their view (as odd as I trust > this sounds to you non-eliminativists out there). > > The argument runs as follows. To take what physics describes with > maximal seriousness - as standing for ontological reality - is just to > take its entities and causal relationships seriously to the same > extent. God knows, physicists have gone to enough trouble to define > these entities and relationships with the most precisely articulated > set of nomological-causal principles we possess. Consequently, taking > these with maximal seriousness entails abjuring other causal > principles as independently efficacious: i.e. showing how - or at > least being committed to the belief that - all higher order causal > principles somehow supervene on these fundamentals. Any other > position would be either obscurantist or incoherent for a physical > realist. > > Now I should say at this point that I'm not criticising this position, > I'm merely articulating it. It follows from the foregoing that > although we may speak in chemical, biological, physiological or > historical narratives, we believe that in principle at least these are > reducible to their physical bases. We also know that although we may > speak of cabbages and kings, weather, oceans, processes, computations > and untold myriads of equally 'emergent' phenomena, we still must > retain our commitment to their reducibility to their physical bases. > So of course, we can - and do - legitimately speak, in this way, of > physical computers as 'performing computations', but following the > foregoing principle we can see that actually this is just a convenient > shorthand for what is occurring in the physical substrates upon which > the notion of computation must - and of course does - rely for its > realisation in the world. > > To be more explicit: The notion of a 'program' or 'computation' - when > we place it under analysis - is a convenient shorthand for an ordered > set of first person concepts which finds its way into the physical > account in the form of various matter-energy dispositions. The > macroscopic media for these are variously paper and ink, actions of > computer keyboards, patterns of voltages in computer circuitry, > illumination of pixels on screens, etc. All of these, of course, can > - and must - reduce to fundamental relations amongst physical > 'ultimates'. At some point after entering the physical causal nexus, > this chain of dispositions may re-enter the first person account > (don't ask me how - it's inessential to the argument) at which point > they may again be construed *by someone* in computational terms in a > first person context. But at no point is the 'computation' - qua > concept - in any way material (pun intended) to the physical account; > a fortiori, in no way can it - or need it - be ascribed causal > significance in terms of the physical account. After all, what could > this possibly mean? Are these spooky 'computational' relationships > 'reaching across' the energy-transfers of the computer circuitry and > changing their outcomes? Of course not. How could they? And why > would they need to? Everything's going along just fine by itself by > purely physical means. > > I hope the foregoing makes it clear that computer programs and their > computations - at the point of physical instantiation - literally > don't exist in the world. They're semantic formulations - ways of > speaking - that have applicability only in the first-person context, > and we can see that this is true any time we like by performing the > kind of 'eliminativist' demonstration performed above: i.e. we can > eliminate the concept without affecting the action on the ground one > whit. Of course, this is the insight that makes the strictly physical > account of mind - as presently understood - problematic if one wishes > to take the first person seriously, because it shows the notion of > 'emergence' to be redundant at the level of causation. It's just > another way of speaking, however much insight it carries - for us. > However, it isn't my wish to make that point again here. Rather my > intention has been to show that whatever options are left in strict > physicalism to address the first person issues seriously - without > eliminating them - emergence is emphatically not one of them. > > I hope this makes the argument clear, and also illustrates the point > of Bruno's reversal of numbers and physics to save the computational > account of mind (and body, as it happens). To be absolutely explicit: > if functional-computational relations are to be taken to be > fundamentally causally efficacious, they must be held to be real and > foundational in exactly the sense (RITSIAR) ascribed to those in the > physical account. But for that to be the case, all other causal > relations must supervene on them - again just as in the physical > account. But now, of course, this must include physics itself. > > Now, you don't of course have to accept COMP. But if you want to be a > physical realist, it means you can only hang on to the computational > explanation of mind by eliminating the mind itself from reality. > Personally, not being committed to such an explanation, this doesn't > in itself constitute my problem with current physical accounts. The > alternative is rather that physics as an account of mind must be > incomplete, or else it is wrong. But that's another story. > > David > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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