On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:

> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
> our conscious experience just exists.  Why are my perceptions orderly
> and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually
> correct?  Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether
> you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious
> experience exists uncaused.



This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism.

I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power.

A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each  
other.

A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest.

A  power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like  
all power)).

Physicists explain by finding elegant laws relating the quanta we can  
measure, but fail indeed linking those quanta to the qualia we live,  
and fail saying where those quanta comes from. But computer science  
suggest a solution, we are universal machine mirroring doing science  
"automatically" betting on "big picture" all the time, relatively to  
other possible universal machines. Then theoretical computer science  
can explain why we feel consciousness unexplainable and explain its  
reason, purpose and power. This explains the mind, but we get the  
problem of justifying the computability and the existence of the  
physical laws from a vast set of computations. The white rabbits and  
white noises. Those universal machine are self-multiplying and self- 
differencing infinitely often in arithmetic. This is a big price: if  
we are machine (a theory which explains consciousness as an  
unconscious bet on a reality), we have to explain the physical laws  
from computer science and logic alone. But now that explanation can be  
tested in nature, making that theory refutable. And this illustrates  
we don't have to abandon rationalism.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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