On 08 Aug 2009, at 22:44, rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
> So physicalism in fact offers no advantage over just asserting that
> our conscious experience just exists. Why are my perceptions orderly
> and why are my predictions about what will happen next usually
> correct? Because that's just the way it is...and this is true whether
> you posit an external universe or just conclude that conscious
> experience exists uncaused.
This is not against physicalism, it is again rationalism.
I would say that consciousness has a reason, a purpose, and a power.
A reason: the many universal numbers and the way they reflect each
A purpose: truth quest, satisfaction quest.
A power: relative self-acceleration (can lead to catastrophes, (like
Physicists explain by finding elegant laws relating the quanta we can
measure, but fail indeed linking those quanta to the qualia we live,
and fail saying where those quanta comes from. But computer science
suggest a solution, we are universal machine mirroring doing science
"automatically" betting on "big picture" all the time, relatively to
other possible universal machines. Then theoretical computer science
can explain why we feel consciousness unexplainable and explain its
reason, purpose and power. This explains the mind, but we get the
problem of justifying the computability and the existence of the
physical laws from a vast set of computations. The white rabbits and
white noises. Those universal machine are self-multiplying and self-
differencing infinitely often in arithmetic. This is a big price: if
we are machine (a theory which explains consciousness as an
unconscious bet on a reality), we have to explain the physical laws
from computer science and logic alone. But now that explanation can be
tested in nature, making that theory refutable. And this illustrates
we don't have to abandon rationalism.
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