On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote: > ronaldheld wrote: > > As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is > > well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of > > mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or > > something else? > > Ronald > > This is /the/ question. It always seems to get sidestepped in > discussions that fail to distinguish between (a) "/reality as some kind > of natural computation/" and (b) "/reality represented by formal > statements(laws of nature) of regularity, //apparent in an observer, > //that may be artificially computed/ /by a Turing style machine/". The > conflation of (a) and (b) is a constant in the discussions here. > > (a) does not need an observer. It /constructs/ an observer. > (b) involves an observer and are regularities constructed by the > observer made by (a) > > The (roughly 5) conflations (from my paper that refutes COMP) are: > > Conflation #1: Deploying an artificial scientist ? Bestowing > scientific knowledge > Conflation #2: COMP(utation) ? experience > Conflation #3: A Scientist ? Formal system > Conflation #4 Rules of a rule generator ? the generated rules > (except once) > Conflation #5 AC Artificial Turing style abstract symbol > manipulation ? NC The computation that is the natural world > > Note that all 5 of these permeate the discussions here. I see it all the > time. The main one is #5. When you realise how many combinations of > these can misdirect a discussion, you realise how screwed up things are. > The following statements summarise the effects: > > (A) The fact that the natural world, to an observer, happens to have > appearances predicted by a set of formal statements (Laws of > Nature/Physics) does not entail that those statements are in any way > involved in running/driving the universe. The hypothesis that laws somehow really exist is actually quite a reasonable abductive explanation for observed regularities. Like most scientific explanations it is less than certain, but that doesn't make it false. > Eg. The assumption that the > concept of a 'multiverse' is valid or relevant is another symptom of the > conflation....the reason? QM is a mathematical construct of type (b), > /not/ an example of (a). The whole concept of a multiverse is a malady > caused by this conflation. Is anything an example of (a)? > (B) The operation of a Turing Machine ( = hardware-invariant//artificial > abstract/ symbol manipulation) is /not /what is going on in the natural > world and, I'm not wild about the hypotheis, but howcome you are so sure it is wrong? >specifically, is /not/ what is happening in the brain (of a > scientist). Assuming 'cognition is computation' is unjustified on any level. > > I find the situation increasingly aggravating. It's like talking to cult > members who's beliefs are predicated on a delusion, and who a re so deep > inside it and so unable to see out of it that they are lost. Common > sense has left the building. The appropriate scientific way out of this > mess is to > > (i) let (a) descriptions and (b) descriptions be, for the purposes, > /separate scientific depictions of the natural world/ If they are not > then at some point in the analysis they will become > indistinguishable...in which case you have a /scientific/logical approach./ > (ii) Drop /all/ assumptions that any discussion involving Turing > machines as relevant to understanding the natural world. This means > accepting,/ for the purposes of sorting this mess out/, (a) as being a > form of computation fundamentally different to a Turing machine, where > the symbols and the processor are literally the same thing. If you > predicate your work on (i) then if COMP is true then at some point, if > (a) and (b) become indistinguishable, /then/ COMP will be a-priori > /predicted/ to be true. I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a respectable thesis (you haven't disproved, BTW, since formal systems *can* handle contradictons, contra your assumption) Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is... Colin Hales

- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fun... Brent Meeker
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is... Colin Hales
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Brent Meeker
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... ronaldheld
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Colin Hales
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... russell standish
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Colin Hales
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... 1Z
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... ronaldheld
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Bruno Marchal

- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental? Quentin Anciaux
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental? Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundame... Colin Hales
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fun... Bruno Marchal
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is... Colin Hales
- Re: Can mind be a computation if physic... Stephen Paul King