On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
> ronaldheld wrote:
> > As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
> > well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
> > mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
> > something else?
> >                                              Ronald
>
> This is /the/ question. It always  seems to get sidestepped in
> discussions that fail to distinguish between (a) "/reality as some kind
> of natural computation/" and (b) "/reality represented by formal
> statements(laws of nature) of regularity, //apparent in an observer,
> //that may be artificially computed/ /by a Turing style machine/". The
> conflation of (a) and (b) is a constant in the discussions here.
>
> (a) does not need an observer. It /constructs/ an observer.
> (b) involves an observer and are  regularities constructed by the
> observer made by (a)
>
> The (roughly 5) conflations (from my paper that refutes COMP) are:
>
> Conflation #1:     Deploying an artificial scientist ? Bestowing
> scientific knowledge
> Conflation #2:     COMP(utation) ? experience
> Conflation #3:    A Scientist  ? Formal system
> Conflation #4     Rules of a rule generator ? the generated rules
> (except once)
> Conflation #5     AC Artificial Turing style abstract symbol
> manipulation ? NC The computation that is the natural world
>
> Note that all 5 of these permeate the discussions here. I see it all the
> time. The main one is #5. When you realise how many combinations of
> these can misdirect a discussion, you realise how screwed up things are.
> The following statements summarise the effects:
>
> (A) The fact that the natural world, to an observer, happens to have
> appearances predicted by a set of formal statements (Laws of
> Nature/Physics) does not entail that those statements are in any way
> involved in running/driving the universe.

The hypothesis that laws somehow really exist is actually quite a
reasonable
abductive explanation for observed regularities. Like most scientific
explanations
it is less than certain, but that doesn't make it false.

> Eg. The assumption that the
> concept of a 'multiverse' is valid or relevant is another symptom of the
> conflation....the reason?  QM is a mathematical construct of type (b),
> /not/ an example of (a). The whole concept of a multiverse is a malady
> caused by this conflation.

Is anything an example of (a)?

> (B) The operation of a Turing Machine ( = hardware-invariant//artificial
> abstract/ symbol manipulation) is /not  /what is going on in the natural
> world and,

I'm not wild about the hypotheis, but howcome you are so sure it
is wrong?

>specifically, is /not/ what is happening in the brain (of a
> scientist). Assuming 'cognition is computation' is unjustified on any level.
>
> I find the situation increasingly aggravating. It's like talking to cult
> members who's beliefs are predicated on a delusion, and who a re so deep
> inside it and so unable to see out of it that they are lost. Common
> sense has left the building. The appropriate scientific way out of this
> mess is to
>
> (i) let (a) descriptions and (b) descriptions be, for the purposes,
> /separate scientific depictions of the natural world/ If they are not
> then at some point in the analysis they will become
> indistinguishable...in which case you have a /scientific/logical approach./
> (ii) Drop /all/ assumptions that any discussion involving Turing
> machines as relevant to understanding the natural world. This means
> accepting,/ for the purposes of sorting this mess out/, (a) as being a
> form of computation fundamentally different to a Turing machine, where
> the symbols and the processor are literally the same thing. If you
> predicate your work on (i) then if COMP is true then at some point, if
> (a) and (b) become indistinguishable, /then/ COMP will be a-priori
> /predicted/ to be true.

I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is
generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a
respectable thesis (you haven't disproved, BTW, since formal
systems *can* handle contradictons, contra your assumption)
Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic

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