Colin Hales wrote: > Hi, > I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can > re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me > nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can classify > fairly succinctly the difference between approaches: > > *(A) Colin* > (a) There is a natural world. > (b) We can describe how it appears to us using the P-consciousness of > scientists. > (c) We can describe how a natural world might be constructed which has > an observer in it like (a) > Descriptions (b) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its > appearances) > Descriptions (C) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its > structure) > (b) and (c) need only ever be 'doxastic' (beliefs). > I hold that these two sets of descriptions (b) and (c) need /not/ be > complete or even perfect/accurate. > Turing-computing (b) or (c) is not an instance of (a)/will not ever make (a) > Turing-computing (b) or (c) can tell you something about the operation > of (a). > NOTE: > If (b) is a description of the rules of chess (no causality whatever, > good prediction of future board appearances), (c) is a description of > the behaviour of chess players (chess causality). There's a rough > metaphor for you. > --------------------------------- > *(B) not-Colin (as seems to be what I see here...)* > There are descriptions of type (b), one of which is quantum mechanics QM. > The math of QM suggests a multiple-histories TOE concept. > If I then project a spurious attribution of idealism into this .... > then ....if I squint at the math I can see what might operate as a > 'first person perspective' > and .... I realise/believe that if I Turing-compute the math, it *is* a > universe. I can make it be reality. > Causality is a mystery solved by prayer to the faith of idealism and > belief in 'comp', driven by the hidden mechanism of the Turing 'tape > reader/punch'. > --------------------------------- > > What's happening here AFAICT, is that players in (B) have been so far > 'down the rabbit hole' for so long they've lost sight of reality and > think 'isms explain things! > > In (A) you get to actually explain things (appearances and causal > necessity). /The price is that you can never truly know reality/. You > get 'asymptotically close to knowing it', though. (A) involves no > delusion about Turing-computation implementing reality. The amount of > 'idealism', 'physicalism', 'materialism' and any other 'ism you need to > operate in the (A) framework is Nil. In (A) the COMP (as I defined it) > is obviously and simply false and there is no sense in which > Turing-style-computation need be attributed to be involved in natural > processes. It's falsehood is expected and natural and consistent with > all empirical knowledge. > > The spurious attributions in (B) are replaced in (A) by the descriptions > (c), all of which must correlate perfectly (empirically) with (b) > through the provision of an observer and a mechanism for observation > which is evidenced in brain material. The concept of a Turing machine is > not needed at all. There may be a sense in which a Turing (C-T) > equivalent of (c) might be constructed. That equivalent is adds zero to > knowledge systems (b) and (c). Under (A) the C-T thesis is perfectly > right but simply irrelevant. > > My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the > delusion of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a > mind. They are throwing away $millions based on a false belief.
If they can create something that *acts as if* it had a mind the money will be well spent. Brent >Their > expectations need to be scientifically defined for a change. I have no > particular interest in disturbing any belief systems here except insofar > as they contribute to the delusion that COMP is true. > > 'nuff said. This is another minor battle in an ongoing campaign. :-) > > Colin --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
