Colin Hales wrote:
> I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can
> re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me
> nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can classify
> fairly succinctly the difference between approaches:
> *(A) Colin*
> (a) There is a natural world.
> (b) We can describe how it appears to us using the P-consciousness of
> (c) We can describe how a natural world might be constructed which has
> an observer in it like (a)
> Descriptions (b) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its
> Descriptions (C) are not the natural world (a) but 'about it' (its
> (b) and (c) need only ever be 'doxastic' (beliefs).
> I hold that these two sets of descriptions (b) and (c) need /not/ be
> complete or even perfect/accurate.
> Turing-computing (b) or (c) is not an instance of (a)/will not ever make (a)
> Turing-computing (b) or (c) can tell you something about the operation
> of (a).
> If (b) is a description of the rules of chess (no causality whatever,
> good prediction of future board appearances), (c) is a description of
> the behaviour of chess players (chess causality). There's a rough
> metaphor for you.
> *(B) not-Colin (as seems to be what I see here...)*
> There are descriptions of type (b), one of which is quantum mechanics QM.
> The math of QM suggests a multiple-histories TOE concept.
> If I then project a spurious attribution of idealism into this ....
> then ....if I squint at the math I can see what might operate as a
> 'first person perspective'
> and .... I realise/believe that if I Turing-compute the math, it *is* a
> universe. I can make it be reality.
> Causality is a mystery solved by prayer to the faith of idealism and
> belief in 'comp', driven by the hidden mechanism of the Turing 'tape
> What's happening here AFAICT, is that players in (B) have been so far
> 'down the rabbit hole' for so long they've lost sight of reality and
> think 'isms explain things!
> In (A) you get to actually explain things (appearances and causal
> necessity). /The price is that you can never truly know reality/. You
> get 'asymptotically close to knowing it', though. (A) involves no
> delusion about Turing-computation implementing reality. The amount of
> 'idealism', 'physicalism', 'materialism' and any other 'ism you need to
> operate in the (A) framework is Nil. In (A) the COMP (as I defined it)
> is obviously and simply false and there is no sense in which
> Turing-style-computation need be attributed to be involved in natural
> processes. It's falsehood is expected and natural and consistent with
> all empirical knowledge.
> The spurious attributions in (B) are replaced in (A) by the descriptions
> (c), all of which must correlate perfectly (empirically) with (b)
> through the provision of an observer and a mechanism for observation
> which is evidenced in brain material. The concept of a Turing machine is
> not needed at all. There may be a sense in which a Turing (C-T)
> equivalent of (c) might be constructed. That equivalent is adds zero to
> knowledge systems (b) and (c). Under (A) the C-T thesis is perfectly
> right but simply irrelevant.
> My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the
> delusion of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a
> mind. They are throwing away $millions based on a false belief.
If they can create something that *acts as if* it had a mind the money will be
> expectations need to be scientifically defined for a change. I have no
> particular interest in disturbing any belief systems here except insofar
> as they contribute to the delusion that COMP is true.
> 'nuff said. This is another minor battle in an ongoing campaign. :-)
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