2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer > it cautiously. > > Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I > have to do some works. > > > On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > >> >> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >>> >>> >>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com>: >>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and >>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models >>>> >>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - >>>> but >>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated >>>> bricks. >>> >>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing >>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified >>> from number and logic alone. >>> >> >> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a >> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it >> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So >> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'. >http://cpc.cx/lP > > Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the > physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite > computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which > is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem > (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA- > hypostases). >

I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis. > >> >> >> >>> >>>> Stuff and consciousness - >>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into >>>> this. >>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can >>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions >>>> till >>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will >>>> play >>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=> >>>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary >>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or >>>> reality to be settled empirically. >>> >>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we >>> discover a >>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say >>> yes >>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp. >> >> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously >> our consciousness is too. > > You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is > Turing emulable (obvious). > But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical > reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8) > > From this it follows that: Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality > is NOT turing emulable. > Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the fact there is a computable theory of reality). So your objections is correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the contradiction. So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false (not COMP), or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is already disproven to disprove the theory. > This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp. > > The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not > yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still > be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature > would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington > instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment. > > > Best, > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---