On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
>> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
>> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
>> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
>> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
>> hypostases).
> I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
> what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
> classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.

A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis, because  
it cannot compute more than a classical machine.
But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of  
classical computations.

The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp computation",  
seems to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum  

According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th  
hypostases, (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say  
if we the comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or  
more, or the same, histories with the right relative proportions.

>> You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
>> Turing emulable   (obvious).
>> But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
>> reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
>>  From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
>> is NOT turing emulable.
> Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
> invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
> fact there is a computable theory of reality).

I am not sure I understand.

UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable   
(roughly speaking).

UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.

So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to  
abandon comp.
(if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).

But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not  
computable, if only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical  
truth, which indeed vastly extends the realm of the computable.

So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality, which  
is a sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal  
machine, looks so much computational.
Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief for  
the one who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a  

> So your objections is
> correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
> with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
> contradiction.

comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)


Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)


Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if  

So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.

So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.

> So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
> (not COMP),

UDA is not a proposition. It is the UD Argument. It is a reasoning. It  
cannot be true or false. It has to be valid or non valid.
If it non valid, then the first line of the reasoning is already  
unjustified, and the conclusion does not follow.

> or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
> reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
> already disproven to disprove the theory.

If the UDA reasoning is valid, then with or without comp, there can be  
no computable theory of 'reality', in general. And about 'physical  
reality' it is an open problem. OK?



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