2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

>> So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are
>> "real".  Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences.
> I deeply disagree here. Even to understand a word like "content" I
> have to believe in some more basic entities which are not conscious.

Ah.  This may even be the subtlest point of all.  The context is
conscious 'of' the content.  The content isn't itself conscious 'of'.
But since both context and content are 'constructed' of the same basic
entities, this can't be a fundamental distinction.  Hence the
distinction must be one of relation.  To introduce a new vocabulary is
difficult.  I would like to talk in terms of mutual access and mutual
relativisation as being basic to entities and their relations.  What
is conscious 'of' what, can then be understood in terms of the
evolution such basic entities towards mutually-relating,
mutually-accessing levels of content-in-context.

> Why, if we are machine, there must be a quale (an incommunicable but 
> "feelable"
> measure) related to some modal apprehension of ourself relatively to other 
> universal
> number. PS I would be pleased if someone can suggest a better wording for 
> "feelable"?

The distinction looked for is between what is directly
apprehendable-in-context, and what is communicable out-of-context.
This distinction is of course absolutely crucial - consequently often
missed - and hence the source of continual and widespread confusion.

The context in question is that of the knower.  What is in-context is
both what the knower knows, and the terms in which it is known. What
is communicable is what can be abstracted, or 'taken out-of-context'.
What is lost in the abstraction is precisely the terms in which it is
known; these can only be restored in the context of another knower.

So, the 'feelable' seems to be the context in which the knowable is
known.  Perhaps we could say that the feelable is the contextual
self-measure, of which the communicable is the abstractable content.


> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

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