2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
> > >
> > > Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
> > >
> > > physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
> > >
> > > computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
> > >
> > > is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
> > >
> > > (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
> > >
> > > hypostases).
> > I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
> > what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
> > classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.
> A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis, because it
> cannot compute more than a classical machine.
> But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of classical
> computations.

Ok but as this could be done on classical machine an order of
magnitude slower I don't see how it is relevant.

> The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp computation", seems
> to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum computers.

I don't understand what you mean here ?

> According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th hypostases,
> (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the
> comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or the same,
> histories with the right relative proportions.

I'm sorry but here too.

> > >
> > > You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
> > >
> > > Turing emulable   (obvious).
> > >
> > > But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
> > >
> > > reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
> > >
> > >  From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
> > >
> > > is NOT turing emulable.
> > >
> > Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
> > invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
> > fact there is a computable theory of reality).
> I am not sure I understand.
> UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable  (roughly
> speaking).
> UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.

If UDA is not valid, you don't get the contradiction (I'm not saying
the argument (UDA) is invalid, I'm saying that you could not deduce
the contradiction if UDA is invalid because the contradiction only
arises if UDA is valid). If you come up with a computable theory of
reality, either UDA is invalid or the computable theory of reality is
invalid. But you can't use UDA to say the computable theory of reality
is invalid if UDA is invalid.

> So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to abandon
> comp.
> (if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).
> But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not computable, if
> only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which indeed
> vastly extends the realm of the computable.

I'm ok with that... but obvious I couldn't say it is, there could be
rules which restrict to something vastly smaller than arithmetical
truth... not that I believe it.

> So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality, which is a
> sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine, looks so
> much computational.
> Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief for the one
> who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a doctor).
> > So your objections is
> > correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
> > with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
> > contradiction.
> comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)
> thus
> Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)
> But
> Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if
> necessary)
> So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.
> So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.

No, not in all circumstance, only if UDA is valid.


> So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
> (not COMP),
> UDA is not a proposition. It is the UD Argument. It is a reasoning. It
> cannot be true or false. It has to be valid or non valid.
> If it non valid, then the first line of the reasoning is already
> unjustified, and the conclusion does not follow.
> or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
> reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
> already disproven to disprove the theory.
> If the UDA reasoning is valid, then with or without comp, there can be no
> computable theory of 'reality', in general. And about 'physical reality' it
> is an open problem. OK?
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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