On 16 Aug 2009, at 21:39, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> 2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:58, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
>>>> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
>>>> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
>>>> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy  
>>>> which
>>>> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open  
>>>> problem
>>>> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
>>>> hypostases).
>>> I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
>>> what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
>>> classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.
>> A quantum computation does not violate Church-turing thesis,  
>> because it
>> cannot compute more than a classical machine.
>> But, a quantum computation covers simultaneously big numbers of  
>> classical
>> computations.
> Ok but as this could be done on classical machine an order of
> magnitude slower I don't see how it is relevant.

It is an evidence wich confirms the sort of reality we can expect with  
comp. below our substitution level we should have evidence of more  
than one computation acting in parallel.

>> The problem of comp today, is that a priori, the "comp  
>> computation", seems
>> to cover much more classical histories than we can with quantum  
>> computers.
> I don't understand what you mean here ?

Comp predicts that any miece of observable matter "does not exist  
primitively" but emerge from a first person view on an infinity of  
identical (with respect to the level of description) but dissimilar  
(below that level) computations. They relative proportion dtemined the  
way we have to quantify the 1-indterminacy. Just remember how the step  
seven works. You are in front of a UD which never stop. To predict  
your next experience accirately, a priori you have to run the whole  
UD, so as to measure the right relative frequencies. In reality, no  
such runhas to be done, because the first person is not aware on any  
of the UD delays, and that is why "nature" does automatically, in  
appearance, what would take an infinite time, if we would search for  
such an accuracy. But then why is the physical world so much  
computable in appearance. Matter has become the phenomenon that we  
have to explain without any recourse of theories based on observable  
It is really the step seven, and we are doing again in detail, so  
don't worry if it is still unclear.

>> According to what we can say today from the 3th, 4th, and 5th  
>> hypostases,
>> (which describe matter) the math are still to hard to say if we the
>> comp-computations, as seen from insides covers less, or more, or  
>> the same,
>> histories with the right relative proportions.
> I'm sorry but here too.

The UD* run all quantum computation going through my state, and a  
priori much more other computations.

>>>> You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness  
>>>> is
>>>> Turing emulable   (obvious).
>>>> But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
>>>> reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
>>>>  From this it follows that:  Reality is turing emulable ====>  
>>>> Reality
>>>> is NOT turing emulable.
>>> Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
>>> invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
>>> fact there is a computable theory of reality).
>> I am not sure I understand.
>> UDA is a reasoning showing that comp => reality is not computable   
>> (roughly
>> speaking).
>> UDA is valid, or not valid. But that's another discussion.
> If UDA is not valid, you don't get the contradiction (I'm not saying
> the argument (UDA) is invalid, I'm saying that you could not deduce
> the contradiction if UDA is invalid because the contradiction only
> arises if UDA is valid). If you come up with a computable theory of
> reality, either UDA is invalid or the computable theory of reality is
> invalid. But you can't use UDA to say the computable theory of reality
> is invalid if UDA is invalid.

Of course. Unless someone find another proof which is valid.
In case someone would find a flaw in the UDA.
But this you can say for all theorems.

>> So if someone rational believes in a computable reality, it has to  
>> abandon
>> comp.
>> (if p -> q, then ~q -> ~p).
>> But now, with comp, it should be obvious that reality is not  
>> computable, if
>> only because, roughly speaking reality is arithmetical truth, which  
>> indeed
>> vastly extends the realm of the computable.
> I'm ok with that... but obvious I couldn't say it is, there could be
> rules which restrict to something vastly smaller than arithmetical
> truth... not that I believe it.

I doubt it too. I mean how to make such restriction, without making  
more or less than a universal machine. We will come back on this.

>> So, with comp, it became astonishing that the physical reality,  
>> which is a
>> sort of universal border of the ignorance of all universal machine,  
>> looks so
>> much computational.
>> Thus QM, with its local and sharable indeterminacies is a relief  
>> for the one
>> who hope comp to be true (like the day before saying yes to a  
>> doctor).
>>> So your objections is
>>> correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
>>> with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
>>> contradiction.
>> comp => Reality is not computable    (UDA)
>> thus
>> Reality is Computable = > ~comp    (contraposition)
>> But
>> Reality is Computable = > Comp   (to emulate me, emulate Reality if
>> necessary)
>> So Reality is computable => (comp and ~comp)   a contradiction.
>> So reality is not computable.  In all circumstance.
> No, not in all circumstance, only if UDA is valid.

I was supposing UDA is valid. But when you present an argument,  
usually you don't have to assume the reasoning valid to pursue. If the  
reasoning is non valid, people (intersted) have to point on where the  
argument if not valid.
In AUDA, do you think we have to assuming Turing, Gödel, Church,  
Kleene to be valid?
If UDA is not valid, all what I say should be abandoned. Well actually  
you can recover a part of the theory by postulating Pytahgoreanism at  
the start (What Peter seems to believe): the assumption that there is  
nothing but numbers (with +, and *). But no need to do that, unless  
you feel an error remains in UDA. Of course *you* can think like that  
only when you are personally convinced by UDA, or by some other  



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