2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

> Here we are back on our little theological divergence.

I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very
generally.  No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will try to
clarify later.  BTW, at the risk of being 'undiplomatic', could I ask
you to read to the end of my remarks and consider them in a general
'theological' context before commenting them 'per comp'?

> The ONE is really arithmetical
> truth before any notion of self is yet defined

This corresponds I think to my intuition of 'that-which-is
self-accessing + self-relativising'.  I would say that per comp this
self-relativisation corresponds to the number relations in which
arithmetical truth is realised.  But it is also central for me that
all such relations are understood as mutually-accessing.  In reply to
Rex you commented that to have a notion of content you needed
something non-conscious, and I commented on this in situ.  My thought
is that relational access must be comprehensible as not-yet-conscious
(because prior to the emergence of the self that will contextualise
it) but nonetheless possessing the sine-qua-non of such consciousness.
 BTW, first-person indeterminacy is already implicit - though not
emergent - at this point, because the identity "I", though it will be
pluralised by relativisation, nonetheless inheres in the whole, not
the part (which represents a relative point-of-view, not a permanently
individuated soul).

> Once a notion of self
> appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true
> provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine
> intellect),

In that case, provable provability - the terrestrial intellect -
corresponds to what can be communicated (or what I called in another
remark, what can be abstracted or taken out-of-context); and true
provability - the divine intellect - corresponds to what is
knowable-in-context.  The context of what-is-knowable corresponds to
the feelable (a perfectly good term IMO).  I think too that this is
where what is often (wrongly IMO) referred to as the explanatory gap
opens up. The gap is not explanatory, because it eludes the scope of
what explanation can be.  IOW, the feelable nature of the quale can be
known-in-context, but never communicated out-of-context.

> which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the
> God of the eastern).

And through relativisation to the 'many points-of-view'

> And this one, due to tension with the intellect,
> will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy
> matter.

On this I am less clear, but in general this corresponds to the
emergent 'content' in terms of which the many points of view integrate
- at the level of mutually consistent 3-descriptions; and segregate -
in terms of the many histories.  Per comp, this derives from - I would
say (very loosely) - statistical consequences of the universal

> Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this
> temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the
> coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the
> falling souls,

i.e. Its pluralities of viewpoints and narratives.

> and the souls see their rise to the ONE.

i.e. The many souls lay claim to a common "I"; their feelings inhabit
a common context; their differentiation is relative, not absolute.

> Same
> arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.



>> Stuff and consciousness -
>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>> reality to be settled empirically.
> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a
> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes
> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

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