Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much  
precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal  
Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some vocabulary  


On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote:

> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <>:
>> Here we are back on our little theological divergence.
> I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
> can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very
> generally.  No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will try to
> clarify later.  BTW, at the risk of being 'undiplomatic', could I ask
> you to read to the end of my remarks and consider them in a general
> 'theological' context before commenting them 'per comp'?
>> The ONE is really arithmetical
>> truth before any notion of self is yet defined
> This corresponds I think to my intuition of 'that-which-is
> self-accessing + self-relativising'.  I would say that per comp this
> self-relativisation corresponds to the number relations in which
> arithmetical truth is realised.  But it is also central for me that
> all such relations are understood as mutually-accessing.  In reply to
> Rex you commented that to have a notion of content you needed
> something non-conscious, and I commented on this in situ.  My thought
> is that relational access must be comprehensible as not-yet-conscious
> (because prior to the emergence of the self that will contextualise
> it) but nonetheless possessing the sine-qua-non of such consciousness.
> BTW, first-person indeterminacy is already implicit - though not
> emergent - at this point, because the identity "I", though it will be
> pluralised by relativisation, nonetheless inheres in the whole, not
> the part (which represents a relative point-of-view, not a permanently
> individuated soul).
>> Once a notion of self
>> appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true
>> provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine
>> intellect),
> In that case, provable provability - the terrestrial intellect -
> corresponds to what can be communicated (or what I called in another
> remark, what can be abstracted or taken out-of-context); and true
> provability - the divine intellect - corresponds to what is
> knowable-in-context.  The context of what-is-knowable corresponds to
> the feelable (a perfectly good term IMO).  I think too that this is
> where what is often (wrongly IMO) referred to as the explanatory gap
> opens up. The gap is not explanatory, because it eludes the scope of
> what explanation can be.  IOW, the feelable nature of the quale can be
> known-in-context, but never communicated out-of-context.
>> which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the
>> God of the eastern).
> And through relativisation to the 'many points-of-view'
>> And this one, due to tension with the intellect,
>> will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy
>> matter.
> On this I am less clear, but in general this corresponds to the
> emergent 'content' in terms of which the many points of view integrate
> - at the level of mutually consistent 3-descriptions; and segregate -
> in terms of the many histories.  Per comp, this derives from - I would
> say (very loosely) - statistical consequences of the universal
> dovetailing.
>> Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this
>> temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the
>> coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the
>> falling souls,
> i.e. Its pluralities of viewpoints and narratives.
>> and the souls see their rise to the ONE.
> i.e. The many souls lay claim to a common "I"; their feelings inhabit
> a common context; their differentiation is relative, not absolute.
>> Same
>> arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.
> Precisely.
> David
>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into  
>>> this.
>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions  
>>> till
>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will  
>>> play
>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we  
>> discover a
>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say  
>> yes
>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
>> Bruno
> >

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