On 17 Aug, 08:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much > precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal > Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some vocabulary > adjustments.

Thanks Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview? David > > Bruno > > On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote: > > > > > > > 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > >> Here we are back on our little theological divergence. > > > I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I > > can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very > > generally. No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will try to > > clarify later. BTW, at the risk of being 'undiplomatic', could I ask > > you to read to the end of my remarks and consider them in a general > > 'theological' context before commenting them 'per comp'? > > >> The ONE is really arithmetical > >> truth before any notion of self is yet defined > > > This corresponds I think to my intuition of 'that-which-is > > self-accessing + self-relativising'. I would say that per comp this > > self-relativisation corresponds to the number relations in which > > arithmetical truth is realised. But it is also central for me that > > all such relations are understood as mutually-accessing. In reply to > > Rex you commented that to have a notion of content you needed > > something non-conscious, and I commented on this in situ. My thought > > is that relational access must be comprehensible as not-yet-conscious > > (because prior to the emergence of the self that will contextualise > > it) but nonetheless possessing the sine-qua-non of such consciousness. > > BTW, first-person indeterminacy is already implicit - though not > > emergent - at this point, because the identity "I", though it will be > > pluralised by relativisation, nonetheless inheres in the whole, not > > the part (which represents a relative point-of-view, not a permanently > > individuated soul). > > >> Once a notion of self > >> appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true > >> provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine > >> intellect), > > > In that case, provable provability - the terrestrial intellect - > > corresponds to what can be communicated (or what I called in another > > remark, what can be abstracted or taken out-of-context); and true > > provability - the divine intellect - corresponds to what is > > knowable-in-context. The context of what-is-knowable corresponds to > > the feelable (a perfectly good term IMO). I think too that this is > > where what is often (wrongly IMO) referred to as the explanatory gap > > opens up. The gap is not explanatory, because it eludes the scope of > > what explanation can be. IOW, the feelable nature of the quale can be > > known-in-context, but never communicated out-of-context. > > >> which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the > >> God of the eastern). > > > And through relativisation to the 'many points-of-view' > > >> And this one, due to tension with the intellect, > >> will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy > >> matter. > > > On this I am less clear, but in general this corresponds to the > > emergent 'content' in terms of which the many points of view integrate > > - at the level of mutually consistent 3-descriptions; and segregate - > > in terms of the many histories. Per comp, this derives from - I would > > say (very loosely) - statistical consequences of the universal > > dovetailing. > > >> Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this > >> temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the > >> coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the > >> falling souls, > > > i.e. Its pluralities of viewpoints and narratives. > > >> and the souls see their rise to the ONE. > > > i.e. The many souls lay claim to a common "I"; their feelings inhabit > > a common context; their differentiation is relative, not absolute. > > >> Same > >> arithmetical truth, but from different points of view. > > > Precisely. > > > David > > >>> Stuff and consciousness - > >>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into > >>> this. > >>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can > >>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions > >>> till > >>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will > >>> play > >>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=> > >>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary > >>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or > >>> reality to be settled empirically. > > >> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we > >> discover a > >> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say > >> yes > >> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp. > > >> Bruno > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---