On 17 Aug, 08:43, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Good intuition David. I think that at some point you are too much
> precise, so that I can refer only to the interview of the Universal
> Machine, and you may agree with her, perhaps by making some vocabulary
Thanks Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview?
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote:
> > 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:
> >> Here we are back on our little theological divergence.
> > I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
> > can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very
> > generally. No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will try to
> > clarify later. BTW, at the risk of being 'undiplomatic', could I ask
> > you to read to the end of my remarks and consider them in a general
> > 'theological' context before commenting them 'per comp'?
> >> The ONE is really arithmetical
> >> truth before any notion of self is yet defined
> > This corresponds I think to my intuition of 'that-which-is
> > self-accessing + self-relativising'. I would say that per comp this
> > self-relativisation corresponds to the number relations in which
> > arithmetical truth is realised. But it is also central for me that
> > all such relations are understood as mutually-accessing. In reply to
> > Rex you commented that to have a notion of content you needed
> > something non-conscious, and I commented on this in situ. My thought
> > is that relational access must be comprehensible as not-yet-conscious
> > (because prior to the emergence of the self that will contextualise
> > it) but nonetheless possessing the sine-qua-non of such consciousness.
> > BTW, first-person indeterminacy is already implicit - though not
> > emergent - at this point, because the identity "I", though it will be
> > pluralised by relativisation, nonetheless inheres in the whole, not
> > the part (which represents a relative point-of-view, not a permanently
> > individuated soul).
> >> Once a notion of self
> >> appears, truth degenerate into provable provability and true
> >> provability (G and G*, the eterrestrial intellect and the divine
> >> intellect),
> > In that case, provable provability - the terrestrial intellect -
> > corresponds to what can be communicated (or what I called in another
> > remark, what can be abstracted or taken out-of-context); and true
> > provability - the divine intellect - corresponds to what is
> > knowable-in-context. The context of what-is-knowable corresponds to
> > the feelable (a perfectly good term IMO). I think too that this is
> > where what is often (wrongly IMO) referred to as the explanatory gap
> > opens up. The gap is not explanatory, because it eludes the scope of
> > what explanation can be. IOW, the feelable nature of the quale can be
> > known-in-context, but never communicated out-of-context.
> >> which will degenerate into the universal self/soul (the
> >> God of the eastern).
> > And through relativisation to the 'many points-of-view'
> >> And this one, due to tension with the intellect,
> >> will fall, and that fall generate the non Turing emulable stuffy
> >> matter.
> > On this I am less clear, but in general this corresponds to the
> > emergent 'content' in terms of which the many points of view integrate
> > - at the level of mutually consistent 3-descriptions; and segregate -
> > in terms of the many histories. Per comp, this derives from - I would
> > say (very loosely) - statistical consequences of the universal
> > dovetailing.
> >> Then the soul will try to go back to the ONE. Except that this
> >> temporal image is a bit a simplification. In a sense the fall and the
> >> coming back are the same arithmetical process. "The ONE see the
> >> falling souls,
> > i.e. Its pluralities of viewpoints and narratives.
> >> and the souls see their rise to the ONE.
> > i.e. The many souls lay claim to a common "I"; their feelings inhabit
> > a common context; their differentiation is relative, not absolute.
> >> Same
> >> arithmetical truth, but from different points of view.
> > Precisely.
> > David
> >>> Stuff and consciousness -
> >>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into
> >>> this.
> >>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
> >>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions
> >>> till
> >>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will
> >>> play
> >>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
> >>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
> >>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
> >>> reality to be settled empirically.
> >> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we
> >> discover a
> >> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say
> >> yes
> >> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
> >> Bruno
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