On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does Bruno.
> > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > whole point
> What does "real" mean?
>Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't defining
>what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as though it has a
>single transparent meaning which coincides with your own notion of physical
There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
>On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would interpret
>"mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical structures exist in
>the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths about them that cannot be
>paraphrased into truths about the physical world (whatever that is). I don't
>think any additional notion of "existence" is normally implied by the term
>"mathematical Platonism" (and many philosophers might not even acknowledge
>that there are any well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean
It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
b) not physcially accountable then they
are c) immaterically existent.
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