On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:

>
> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> some
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.



That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle- 
Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor  
numbers).

  I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent  
structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the  
existence of primitive matter.

All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or  
Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does  
not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and  
logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones  
will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a  
contradiction.

So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness  
of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.

Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that  
"Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to  
give referents to such "Peter Jones". Fregean sense is enough to see  
that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that  
they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they  
are not.

Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable.

If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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