On 18 Aug, 12:52, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 04:32:18 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: email@example.com
> > On 18 Aug, 12:00, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:01:51 -0700
> > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > To: firstname.lastname@example.org
> > > > On 18 Aug, 10:51, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > > Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 01:55:35 -0700
> > > > > > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > > > > > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > > > > > To: email@example.com
> > > > > > >However, some physicists - Julian Barbour for one - use
> > > > > > > the term in a way that clearly has reference, as I think does
> > > > > > > Bruno.
> > > > > > Any Platonists thinks there is a real immaterial realm, that is the
> > > > > > whole point
> > > > > What does "real" mean?
> > > > ITSIAR
> > > Don't know what that stands for--I think I've seen that abbreviation
> > > before in some other recent posts, but there have been a lot of posts
> > > I've missed over the last few weeks so maybe it was defined in one of the
> > > ones I didn't read. Anyway, could you explain?
> > In The Sense I Am Real
> And what sense is that?
I can assert that X >= Y without knowing what X and Y are. The point
is that numbers of immaterial computers have
to be at least as real as I am if they are somehow generating me.
RITSIAR is a relative level of existence, not a kind of existence.
>You are obviously real in the Quinean sense, and Platonists would say numbers
>are real in this sense too, but you are also real in the sense of having
>conscious experiences, and perhaps in the sense of being "physically real"
>(although as always I have doubts about whether this is meaningful as distinct
>from the other two senses), I think most mathematical Platonists would *not*
>say numbers are real in these senses.
I don't think those are different sense of being real, I think they
are different properties things can have. A red bus does not exist
redly, it is just a red thing that exists in the ordinary sense.
> > > > >Once again it seems to be a synonym for existence, but you aren't
> > > > >defining what notion of existence you're talking about, you speak as
> > > > >though it has a single transparent meaning which coincides with your
> > > > >own notion of physical existence.
> > > > There is a basic meaning to existence, the Johnsonion one.
> > > Of course Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley's idealism was not a very
> > > philosophical one, it was either humorous or anti-intellectual, depending
> > > on how seriously he intended it.
> > It was not very apriori or theoretical. But then it is perverse to
> > ignore the fact that we do in fact exist. Why struggle
> > for defintions when the brute fact stare yo in the face?
> > >Any philosopher could tell you that Johnson would have exactly the same
> > >experience of feeling the rock against his boot in a lawlike idealist
> > >universe, like the "scenario A" I offered in the post before the one you
> > >are responding to here.
> > The he would exist in an idealist universe. He would still exist.
> Sure, but Johnson's kicking the rock was specifically meant to refute
> idealism, so I thought that's what you were referring to.
I was referring to the lack of necessity of putting up a theoretical,
argument for my own existence.
>My whole argument with you has been that it's sufficient to posit the Quinean
>existence of mathematical universes + the existence of conscious experience in
>at least one of these mathematical universes, that there is no need to posit
>any additional notion called "physical existence" that's distinct from both
>mathematical existence in the Quinean sense and existence in the sense of
>having real conscious experiences. It would help if you'd address my comments
>about "scenario A" vs. "scenario B" in that earlier post.
Physical existence may be unnecessary if Platonic existence is
assumed. *My* whole argument is that Platonic
existence is unnecessary if physical existence is assumed.
> > > > >On the contrary, I think most modern analytic philosophers would
> > > > >interpret "mathematical Platonism" to mean *only* that mathematical
> > > > >structures exist in the Quinean sense, i.e. that there are truths
> > > > >about them that cannot be paraphrased into truths about the physical
> > > > >world (whatever that is). I don't think any additional notion of
> > > > >"existence" is normally implied by the term "mathematical Platonism"
> > > > >(and many philosophers might not even acknowledge that there are any
> > > > >well-defined notions of of 'existence' besides the Quinean one)
> > > > It is absolutely clear from the above that if they are a) existent and
> > > > b) not physcially accountable then they
> > > > are c) immaterically existent.
> > > What do you mean by "physically accountable"?
> > What you mean: that there are truths about them that can be
> > paraphrased into truths about the physical world
> > > Are you referring to the notion that mathematical truths cannot be
> > > paraphrased as physical truths (assuming that what we call the physical
> > > world is itself not just a part of Platonia)? If so, then yes, I'd say
> > > according to the Quinean definition of "existence", numbers exist but not
> > > as part of the physical world.
> > Mathematical truths are relationships between concepts, and concepts
> > are neural acitivity. So the paraphrase
> > can be made.
> Wait, so do you believe there is no objective truth about mathematical
> statements that humans haven't specifically figured out in their brains? For
> example, do you think there's an objective truth about the googolplexth digit
> of pi?
I don't think there is a *subjective* truth about it. I think the
principle of bivalence is true about it -- it either is true or it
isn't. I think its
truth value is fixed for all practical purposes. But then these are
all hypothetical ways of talking, because the statement hasn't even
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