On 18 Aug, 09:55, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.
That's a good start - contingent vs. necessary is a key distinction in
theoretical approaches, as I've said. Given that, under PM, just how
'material' do explanatory entities have to be? Perhaps the clue is in
the pun: IOW they must obviously be material to the explanation - i.e.
their referents must be plausibly RITSIAR. Is this just to say
material => whatever-is-RITSIAR? And what about the mental? Is
mental => material under a different - but paraphrasable -
> > Perhaps our
> > ultimate explanatory entities need be conceived as no more 'material'
> > than necessary for us to depend on them as plausible pre-cursors of
> > the more obviously material; but of course, no less so either.
> > While I've got you here, as it were - I don't see why this wouldn't
> > apply equally to the mental: IOW our explanatory entities need be
> > conceived as no more 'mental' than necessary for us to depend on them
> > as plausible precursors of the more obviously mental; but no less so
> > either.
> > David
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