2009/8/18 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a >> >> statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about reality >> >> and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could >> >> instead paraphrase this in terms of what images and concepts are in >> >> people's mind when they use the word "unicorn"; and if you're an >> >> eliminative materialist who wants to avoid accepting mental images and >> >> concepts as a basic element of your ontology, it might seem plausible >> >> that you could *in principle* paraphrase all statements about human >> >> concepts using statements about physical processes in human brains, >> >> although we may lack the understanding to do that now. >> >> I presume that one could substitute 'computation' for 'unicorn' in the >> above passage? If so, the human concept that it is 'computation' that >> gives rise to consciousness could be "paraphrased using statements >> about physical processes in human brains". So what may we now suppose >> gives such processes this particular power? Presumably not their >> 'computational' nature - because now "nous n'avons pas besoin de cette >> hypothèse-là" (which I'm sure you will recall was precisely the point >> I originally made). > > That's completely back to front. Standard computaitonalism > regards computation as a physical process taking place > in brains and computer hardware. It doesn't exist > at the fundamental level like quarks, and it isn't non-existent > like unicorns. It is a higher-level existent, like horses.
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that *any* human concept is *eliminable* (my original point) after such reduction to primary physical processes. So why should 'computation' escape this fate? How would you respond if I said the brain is conscious because it is 'alive'? Would 'life' elude the paraphrased reduction to physical process? BTW, let's be clear: I'm not saying that physicalism is false (although IMO it is at least incomplete). I'm merely pointing out one of its consequences. > It's prima facie possible for physicalism to be true > and computationalism false. That is to say that > the class of consciousness-causing processes might > not coincide with any proper subset of the class > of computaitonal processes. Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper subset of the class of computational processes". Physicalist theory of mind urgently required. QED David > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---