On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which
> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,
> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
> contingent obeys laws.
AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in:
1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then
matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances
of any kind, mental or physical.
2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of
appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate
to appeal to CTM.
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are
compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form -
seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this
argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic
currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or
disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what
basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds
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