On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no  
> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,  
> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of  
> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which  
> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,  
> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
> contingent obeys laws.

AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in:

1)  ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then
matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances
of any kind, mental or physical.

2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of
appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate
to appeal to CTM.

Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia).   I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form.  Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are
compatible).  Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form -
seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this
argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic
currently generating so much heat.  UDA-8 sets out to be provable or
disprovable on purely logical grounds.  I for one am unclear on what
basis it could be attacked as invalid.  Can anyone show strong grounds
for this?


> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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