On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
> It seems that your argument uses MGA to
> conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so
> Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
> seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct
> showing they are material. But this is already well known from "brain in a
> vat" thought
I thought that MGA was an argument contra the compatibility of the
computational theory of mind and a primitive matter ontology (i.e. CTM
+ PM = false), explicitly on the *starting* assumption of CTM. That
is, starting from CTM, MGA says you can't *have* a correct argument
showing you are material. Alternatively, if you don't begin with CTM,
you're not forced to resort to arithmetical or any other type of
mathematical realism. Isn't that about the size of it?
> >or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
> > not. At this stage.
> > Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
> > that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
> > from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.
> >>> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing
> >>> emulable.
> >> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
> >> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
> > But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
> > correct to. It is the same reasoning.
> > Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
> > one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
> > doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
> > better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
> > sense.
> Or it is a relation to the rest of the world and you can say yes so long as
> the doctor
> maintains your relations to the rest of the world - i.e. physically
> instantiates your
> >>> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.
> >> Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
> >> materially?
> > He will try.
> >> Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.
> > Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> > doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> > assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
> > universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which
> > capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,
> > and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
> > contingent obeys laws.
> > Bruno
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