2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.

And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't. > >> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your >> >> "consciousness >> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature. >> >> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence. >> >> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used >> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions, >> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum). > > No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that > mathematical > existence is ontological existence. As I have been Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it. > >> > You keep confusing the >> > idea >> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs >> > with the >> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs. >> >> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It >> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way, >> with correct approximation of its neighborhood. > > Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything. You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer. >>It is hard to >> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge >> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there >> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain. > > Same mistake > All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would > contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist. > >> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one, >> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and >> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses. >> >> >> >> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that >> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease >> >> to >> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones". >> >> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR. >> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it, >> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there. >> >> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take >> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer >> science. > > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is > ontological RITISAR existence. So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical machine ? What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ? If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ? If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? If I never restart it do you still exists ? If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do you still exists ? >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. > > So? It hasn't been. > >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove >> >> that >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they >> >> are not. >> >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs >> > doesn't make us wrong >> > about anything. >> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is >> material. > > So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a > computer > when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that > argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical > hypothesis, and there are many. > >> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But >> then your reasoning has to be false too. >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not >> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or >> not. > > The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses > are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence > for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no > certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest > plausibility. > > >>At this stage. >> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith, >> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet, >> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix. > > I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any > more than I can be "in" Nanrnia So you can't be a program... Regards, Quentin > >> >> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing >> >> emulable. >> >> > No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me >> > *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong. >> >> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be >> correct to. > > False. You are treating all reasoning as being assumptionless and > apriori. Both me's could have arguments of equal validity, but one of > the argumetns could have true assumptions and the other false > assumptionsm > because the truth of the assumptions (and hence the soundness of the > argument) > depends on external factors which vary. > >>It is the same reasoning. >> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real" >> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your >> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you >> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that >> sense. > > I don't need to strenuously argue against that there is something > special about me that makes me un-emulable , or un-BIV-able. > I just have to note that there is no evidence for either hypothesis. > The burden is on the sceptic. > >> >> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor. >> >> > Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me >> > materially? >> >> He will try. >> >> > Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out. >> >> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no >> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, >> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of >> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which >> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, >> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- >> contingent obeys laws. >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---