2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>> > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
>> > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
>> > ontological RITISAR existence.
>>
>> So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
>> running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My
>> question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program
>> written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly
>> equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the
>> machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the
>> bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical
>> machine ?
>>
>> What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ?
>
> Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in
> fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not
> going to make me immaterial.

If I'm reading the program and executing it in my head with a pencil
and writing down the result on a sheet of paper... would you exists ?
in my head ? on the paper ? on the pencil ? Would you cease to exists
at the very moment I stop doing it ?

>
>> If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ?
>
> no
>
>> If I restart it ? Do you still exists ?
>
> yes
>
>> If I never restart it do you
>> still exists ?
>
> no
>
>>If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do
>> you still exists ?
>
> no
>
>
>> >> See "conscience & m├ęcanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running
>> >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented
>> >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.
>>
>> > So? It hasn't been.
>>
>> >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see
>> >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove
>> >> >> that
>> >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
>> >> >> are not.
>>
>> >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
>> >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
>> >> > doesn't make us wrong
>> >> > about anything.
>>
>> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
>> >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
>> >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct
>> >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is
>> >> material.
>>
>> > So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a
>> > computer
>> > when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that
>> > argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical
>> > hypothesis, and there are many.
>>
>> >> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical
>> >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But
>> >> then your reasoning has to be false too.
>> >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not
>> >> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
>> >> not.
>>
>> > The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses
>> > are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence
>> > for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no
>> > certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest
>> > plausibility.
>>
>> >>At this stage.
>> >> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
>> >> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
>> >> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.
>>
>> > I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any
>> > more than I can be "in" Nanrnia
>>
>> So you can't be a program...
>>
>
> So I *can* be a runnign programme. I *can't* be abstract software.
> >
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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