2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>: >> > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence. >> > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is >> > ontological RITISAR existence. >> >> So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're >> running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My >> question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program >> written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly >> equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the >> machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the >> bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical >> machine ? >> >> What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ? > > Whatever combination of hardware and software I am in > fact running on. Juggling combinations of h/w and s/w is not > going to make me immaterial.
If I'm reading the program and executing it in my head with a pencil and writing down the result on a sheet of paper... would you exists ? in my head ? on the paper ? on the pencil ? Would you cease to exists at the very moment I stop doing it ? > >> If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ? > > no > >> If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? > > yes > >> If I never restart it do you >> still exists ? > > no > >>If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do >> you still exists ? > > no > > >> >> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running >> >> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented >> >> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too. >> >> > So? It hasn't been. >> >> >> >> Fregean sense is enough to see >> >> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove >> >> >> that >> >> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they >> >> >> are not. >> >> >> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in >> >> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs >> >> > doesn't make us wrong >> >> > about anything. >> >> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct >> >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us >> >> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct >> >> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is >> >> material. >> >> > So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a >> > computer >> > when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that >> > argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical >> > hypothesis, and there are many. >> >> >> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical >> >> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But >> >> then your reasoning has to be false too. >> >> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not >> >> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or >> >> not. >> >> > The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses >> > are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence >> > for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no >> > certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest >> > plausibility. >> >> >>At this stage. >> >> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith, >> >> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet, >> >> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix. >> >> > I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any >> > more than I can be "in" Nanrnia >> >> So you can't be a program... >> > > So I *can* be a runnign programme. I *can't* be abstract software. > > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---