On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia).   I've also
> > argued this, in a somewhat different form.  Peter's position I think
> > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are
> > compatible).  Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form -
> > seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this
> > argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic
> > currently generating so much heat.  UDA-8 sets out to be provable or
> > disprovable on purely logical grounds.  
> >I for one am unclear on what
> > basis it could be attacked as invalid.  Can anyone show strong grounds
> > for this?
>
> Of course, no argument can validly come to a  metaphysical conclusion--
> in this
> case, that matter does not exist --without making a single
> metaphysical assumption.
> The argument is therefore invalid, or not purely logical

Again, with respect, you appear to assume that MGA argues that matter
doesn't exist.  In fact it argues that CTM + PM = false, which is not
the same thing at all.  It is possible to retain matter as primitive
(which I for one don't rule out, dependent on a more complete
understanding of mind-body) whilst relinquishing an a priori CTM.
What would be needed, as I've said elsewhere, would be an alternative
theory of mind which - like any other 'transcendent' a posteriori
analysis - would be capable of direct elucidation in terms of of
primary physical processes.  Bruno has argued separately against the
plausibility of finding such a theory, but this isn't implicit in MGA,
AFAICS.

David
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