On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:58, Flammarion wrote:

> I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that
> if you write down hypothetical truths about what
> an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude
> that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine.

I don't proceed in that way at all. I propose a step by step reasoning  
which shows that CTM + PM leads to an epistemological contradiction,  
so that CTM has to justify the appearance of PM. (= UDA)
Then I show that theoretical computer science is very promising to  
extract those appearance of PM. (= AUDA).

> It's like saying you can go from making a theoretical study of the
> aerodynamics of Pegasus to taking a ride on Pegasus's back.

Comparing mathematical objects with fairy tales objects can hardly help.

>>>>   I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from  
>>>> contingent
>>>> structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
>>> I am saying that material existence *is* contingent
>>> existence. It is not a structure of anything.
>> Plotinus says that too! Me too.
>> With church thesis this is can be made more precise in term of not-
>> computable or not-provable, or some relativizations.
> You're still not getting it. PM isn't a non-computable number.
> It isn't mathematical at all. You really do think in a box..

If you believe that a deduction is not valid, you have to say where,  
and why.

>>>> Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
>>>> existence of primitive matter.
>>> Well, at least I don't talk about immaterial machines dreaming each
>>> other.
>> In arithmetic, that happens all the time. More below.
> !!!!
> In arithemetic. people write down problems on blackboards and solve
> them.

If comp is assumed, some computation correspond to dream, and their  
existence can be proved in arithmetic.
And the MGA argument shows that no machine can make the difference  
between "real", virtual and arithmetical.

> There is no immaterial existence at all, and  my agreeign to have
> my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.

Meaning: UDA is non valid. I am still waiting your argument.

>> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
>> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
>> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).
> No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that
> mathematical
> existence is ontological existence.

I have no clue what you mean by "ontological existence", except  
"physical existence", but this beg the question.
If you don't deny the arithmetical truth, you accept arithmetical  
realism, and you cannot deny the UD, so you should be able to follow  
the argument. And if you believe the conclusion is wrong, you should  
say where.

> Since it [UD] does not exist, it does not contain anything.

UD exists like PI exists. The rest is taken into account in the  
argument that I am referring to.
Don't say that PI and circle does not exists. Say that PI and circles  
does not exist physically. It is quite different.

>> It is hard to
>> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and  
>> huge
>> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there
>> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.
> Same mistake
> All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would
> contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist.

What you mean is that UD does not physically exists. (Well I am not  
sure this is true, but OK).
But MGA shows that the UD does not need to physically exist for my  
(non primary) physical existence.

> That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
> You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
> ontological RITISAR existence.

I still don't know if by RITSIAR you mean "real in the sense my first  
person is real" or "real as my body is real".
You told me that the difference is epistemological, and I can accept  
this (for a while). But that makes a huge difference in the meaning of  
RITSIAR. I cannot doubt my first person, but I can doubt my body.  
After UDA+MGA, my first person appears to have an infinity of bodies  
(like in QM without collapse), and this makes the difference between  
those two forms of RITSIAR even bigger.

>> See "conscience & m├ęcanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running
>> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented
>> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.
> So? It hasn't been.

It has been implemented, and it has run for a week in 1991. This is  
anecdotical. Just to say that the UD is a concrete program.

> The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses
> are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence
> for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no
> certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest
> plausibility.

I have better that a scrap of evidence: a deductive argument. A proof,  
that COMP => physics has to emerge from numbers.

But I have also evidences for comp, in the sense that the physics  
which emerge from numbers is a multiversial physics, and the quantum  
reality makes many people to consider that we may live in a  
multiversial reality. And I have also more technical evidences coming  
from the Arithmetical UDA. That are evidence for comp.

> I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any
> more than I can be "in" Nanrnia

... then CTM (comp) is false, and you should help us to find the error  
in UDA, instead of just denying existence for what almost everybody  
accepts to exist mathematically. Arithmetical reality kicks back.

>>> No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
>>> *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
>> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
>> correct to.
> False. You are treating all reasoning as being assumptionless and
> apriori. Both me's could have arguments of equal validity, but one of
> the argumetns could have true assumptions and the other false
> assumptionsm
> because the truth of the assumptions (and hence the soundness of the
> argument)
> depends on external factors which vary.

No, in this protocol, both have the same assumptions. If not, you are  
begging the question.

>> The mind-body problem comes from the fact that we have not yet find
>> how to attach consciousness to matter.
> No, it comes from no being able to attach *phenomenal*
> consciousness to mathematical structures. There is no problem
> attaching *cognition* to matter at all. If the matter of your brain
> is disrupted, so are your though processes.

What is *phenomenal* consciousness? Is not consciousness always  
phenomenal? How do you define matter and attach cognition to it? You  
are talking like if materialist did find a solution of the mind-body  
problem. This is not the case.
And yes, if the matter in my brain is disrupted, so are my thought  
processes. This is one reason to accept comp. So what?

I have some colleagues who argues that MGA is not needed. They have  
read some papers on the phantom limbs, and they argue that  
consciousness (like the consciousness of a pain in the limb) is  
obviously non material, because it cannot be located in the limb, and  
cannot be located in the brain, nor elsewhere. They find that the "yes  
doctor" hypothesis, when well understood (yes doctor *qua computatio*)  
makes us immaterial at once, and that it is obvious that matter is  
what needs an explanation.  I have succeeded in explaining to some of  
them that such argument can't go through, on purely logical grounds,  
but MGA does go through, and if you think plausible, against such  
colleagues, that consciousness is a material phenomenon, then UDA  
shows you that such a material phenomenon cannot be Turing emulable.

>> It is the same reasoning.
>> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
>> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
>> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
>> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
>> sense.
> I don't need to strenuously argue against that there is something
> special about me that makes me un-emulable , or un-BIV-able.
> I just have to note that there is no evidence for either hypothesis.
> The burden is on the sceptic.

There are ton of evidences. My favorite one is that *primary* matter  
is not even assumed in any physical text.
I have finished to read Aristotle for the second times, and I am not  
sure at all that he is responsible for that notion. I think that such  
a notion appeared the first time in catholic texts to prevent a  
protestant understanding of the relation between Jesus and braid.
I may begin to ask you to define what is primary matter. Your use of  
it looks more and more like the use of "God".
And about conceptual analysis of that notion of matter, I would like a  
definition of matter which does not rely on matter, like Dennett asks  
for consciousness. If not, it is a sort of fake God.
To say that matter is fundamental, comma, is the same as saying that  
consciousness is fundamental comma. It is the same kind of misuse of  
God-like notion which explains the difficulty to keep a reasonable  
scientific, modest and agnostic, attitude in the fundamental fields.

I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good  
news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of  
Darwin idea that things evolve. Now we know, assuming comp, that the  
physical laws have a reason, and that they evolves, in a non tempral  
or spatial way, in some arithmetico-logical space.

It is not yet a complete solution of the mind-body problem, but it is  
a progress. It provides also a purely arithmetical interpretation of  
Plotinus neo-platonism, and that is interesting per se. After 1500  
years of materialism, together with variate form of person  
eliminativism, humanity could use a bit of a theory which provides  
some importance and respect toward persons.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to