> On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote:
>> Flammarion wrote:
>>> Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
>>> not about
>>> explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
>>> contingency as the price
>>> paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitrariness are *both*
>>> desiderata, so there is no black-and-white sense in which
>>> Everythingism wins.
>> But parsimony in *theory* is what is desirable.
> Everythingists tend to think that, and their opponents tend
> not to.
>> Almost any physics explanation of how the
>> universe came to be is going to predict the existence of many universes. If
>> it's based on
>> QM is will be probabilistic. So then there is a tension with parsimony
>> between an
>> unparsimonious addition to the theory, i.e. "and just one thing happens",
>> and keeping the
>> theory parsimonious, but allowing an unparsimonious ontology in which "they
>> all happen."
> Physical many-world theories are still constrained down to a subset of
> the total of maths. Everythingist theories are not.
>>>> > > In that case you might as well call it "primary ectoplasm" or
>>>> "primary asdfgh".
>>>>> You might as well call "2" the successor of "0". All symbols are
>>>> My point was just that I think it's *misleading* to use the word "matter"
>>>> which already has all sorts of intuitive associations for us, when really
>>>> you're talking about something utterly mysterious whose properties are
>>>> completely divorced from our experiences, more like Kant's "noumena" which
>>>> were supposed to be things-in-themselves separate from all phenomenal
>>>> properties (including quantitative ones).
>>> I don't accept that characterisation of PM. (BTW, phenomenal
>>> properties could be accounted for
>>> as non-mathematical attributes of PM)
>> I think this is a category mistake. Mathematical attributes belong to *the
>> or PM, not to PM. And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply
>> to be precise
>> and consistent.
> I think that is a bizzare statement. You mean I can;t say that a
> cubic object is cubic,
> because a "cube" is part of geometry, which is part of maths? If the
> attributes belong to the
> descriptions only, the descriptions are never going to be accurate at
> all, since the descriptions
> are attributing the attributes to the objects.
No, what I mean is that when you describe something as cubic the description
mathematical - not the object itself.
>> And the descriptions are necessarily mathematical simply to be precise
>> and consistent.
> a) if they are not precise descriptions *of* something -- of
> properties that things have -- what's the point?
My point is that things can have mathematical properties and yet not be
objects. An object can be triangular and yet not consist of three intersecting
> All you are going to achieve is a kind of fictive self-consistency,
> like a set of cooked books.
> b) there is no apriori necessity why the world should be susceptible
> to mathematical description
> at all iTFP
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