Flammarion wrote: > > > On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: >> David Nyman wrote: >>> On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>>> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no >>>> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive, >>>> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of >>>> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which >>>> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation, >>>> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent- >>>> contingent obeys laws. >>> AFAICS the essence of Bruno's dispute with Peter consists in: >>> 1) ***If you accept the computational theory of mind (CTM)*** then >>> matter can no longer be primitive to your explanations of appearances >>> of any kind, mental or physical. >>> 2) ***If you assert that matter is primitive to your explanation of >>> appearances of any kind, mental or physical (PM)*** it is illegitimate >>> to appeal to CTM. >>> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM >>> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also >>> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think >>> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in any case that CTM and PM are >>> compatible). Hence the validity of UDA-8 - in its strongest form - >>> seems central to the current dispute, since it is essentially this >>> argument that motivates the appeal to arithmetical realism, the topic >>> currently generating so much heat. UDA-8 sets out to be provable or >>> disprovable on purely logical grounds. I for one am unclear on what >>> basis it could be attacked as invalid. Can anyone show strong grounds >>> for this? >>> David >> I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether >> to regard it >> as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a >> reductio against >> the "yes doctor" hypothesis. Saying yes to the doctor seems very >> straightforward when you >> just think about the doctor replacing physical elements of your brain with >> functionally >> similar elements made of silicon or straw or whatever. But then I reflect >> that I, with my >> new head full of straw, must still interact with the world. So I have not >> been reduced to >> computation unless the part of the world I interact with is also replaced by >> computational >> elements > > If you were a programme interacting with the world before, > you still will be after a function-preserving replacement is made.
Yes, but my future experience will not have been reduced to the running of Turing-emulable program - it will depend on impinging effects not part of the program, unless the environment is also part of the emulation. Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---