On 19 Aug 2009, at 19:23, David Nyman wrote:
> On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
>> news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization
>> Darwin idea that things evolve.
> We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to whether "CTM
> + PM = true" is central to his argument.
I am not sure I understand. Peter seems to defend, like many both CTM
So he assumes, without showing, there is an error in UDA, which is a
proof that CTM + PM is epistemologically inconsistent.
> On the basis of some of the
> things he's said in reply to me recently, I think it may not be. If
> we could resolve this key point, perhaps it would cast fresh light on
> some of the issues thrown up e.g. (BTW I'm not expecting answers to
> these questions here and now):
> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of
Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light
on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful
representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry.
The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical
assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then
Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough)
> 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the
> basis of these different assumptions?
Hmm... It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of
comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps
coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If
UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to
Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow,
explorations of the matrix. I dunno.
> 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable,
> assuming "CTM + PM = false"?
It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument! You
are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks!
UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this: CTM ->
not PM, or this: PM -> ~CTM.
Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs
even more mathematical logic. Sorry.
1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the
propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is
non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases.
2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that
you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models
of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no
more complete. You have to add a formula to characterize them.
3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be
4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are
very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not
> 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation =
> substitution" have any force outside CTM?
I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am
not sure what you refer to.
> IOW if I believe I'm made
> of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating
> proposals from the doctor?
If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you
will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person.
If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory
of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in
any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors
> ....and so forth.
> Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the
> discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved.
If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the
point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and
CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in
step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is
ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means
Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be
applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of
CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists.
UDA would loss its main purpose!
I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that
they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is
false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it
*is* an epistemological contradiction).
Too bad for them. OK? The rationalist loves to search errors and
criticize reasoning. I have decompose the reasoning in step to provide
helps, but dogmatic person seems not to take the opportunity. I guess
CTM+PM is a sort of "religious" dogma, for them.
And they are never clear on PM. Somehow they cannot be clear, because
if they are too much clear, Church thesis entails that comp + a level
low enough will "generate the appearance of that PM". This why Peter
is nervous with the idea that PM is really what is relatively
contingent in the arithmetical context. "PM" exists but with comp it
is just "M".
Now David, if you have any trouble with UDA, as you seem to have
sometimes, I can help, and I am certainly open to the idea that things
are still unclear, or even that, who knows, a fatal error is hidden.
But since the time, I doubt it. Some reluctance to Platonism is just
normal, given history, but also a natural fear that all Lobian machine
can have in front of their ignorance.
Note that many in this list have still problem with step-8, and that
is why I have begun to do the "step seven" with the math in details,
to get a better understanding of what happens in step 8, and what is
computational supervenience. The math is counter-intuitive.
Computerland is wonderland!
May be you don't want to do the math? The math for UDA are really
basic compared to the math needed for AUDA.
But that's OK. Take it easy,
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at