On 19 Aug 2009, at 19:23, David Nyman wrote:

> On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
>> news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization  
>> of
>> Darwin idea that things evolve.
> We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to whether "CTM
> + PM = true" is central to his argument.

I am not sure I understand. Peter seems to defend, like many both CTM  
and PM.
So he assumes, without showing, there is an error in UDA, which is a  
proof that CTM + PM is epistemologically inconsistent.

> On the basis of some of the
> things he's said in reply to me recently, I think it may not be.  If
> we could resolve this key point, perhaps it would cast fresh light on
> some of the issues thrown up e.g. (BTW I'm not expecting answers to
> these questions here and now):
> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?

Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.  
Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a  
large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of  
Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light  
on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful  
representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry.
The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical  
assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then  
Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough)

> 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the
> basis of these different assumptions?

Hmm...  It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of  
comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps  
coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If  
UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to  
Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow,  
explorations of the matrix. I dunno.

> 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable,
> assuming "CTM + PM = false"?

It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument!  You  
are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks!

UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this:  CTM ->  
not PM,  or this: PM -> ~CTM.

Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs  
even more mathematical logic. Sorry.
1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the  
propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is  
non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases.
2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that  
you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models  
of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no  
more complete.  You have to add a formula to characterize them.
3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be  
4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are  
very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not  
collapsing actually.

> 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation =
> substitution" have any force outside CTM?

I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am  
not sure what you refer to.

> IOW if I believe I'm made
> of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating
> proposals from the doctor?

If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you  
will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person.
If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory  
of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in  
any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors  
(the QM-Copenhagen).

> ....and so forth.
> Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the
> discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved.

If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the  
point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and  
CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in  
step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is  
ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means  
Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be  
applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of  
CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists.  
UDA would loss its main purpose!

I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that  
they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is  
false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it  
*is* an epistemological contradiction).

Too bad for them. OK? The rationalist loves to search errors and  
criticize reasoning. I have decompose the reasoning in step to provide  
helps, but dogmatic person seems not to take the opportunity. I guess  
CTM+PM is a sort of "religious" dogma, for them.

And they are never clear on PM. Somehow they cannot be clear, because  
if they are too much clear, Church thesis entails that comp + a level  
low enough will "generate the appearance of that PM". This why Peter  
is nervous with the idea that PM is really what is relatively  
contingent in the arithmetical context. "PM" exists but with comp it  
is just "M".

Now David, if you have any trouble with UDA, as you seem to have  
sometimes, I can help, and I am certainly open to the idea that things  
are still unclear, or even that, who knows, a fatal error is hidden.
But since the time, I doubt it. Some reluctance to Platonism  is just  
normal, given history, but also a natural fear that all Lobian machine  
can have in front of their ignorance.
Note that many in this list have still problem with step-8, and that  
is why I have begun to do the "step seven" with the math in details,  
to get a better understanding of what happens in step 8, and what is  
computational supervenience. The math is counter-intuitive.  
Computerland is wonderland!

May be you don't want to do the math? The math for UDA are really  
basic compared to the math needed for AUDA.

But that's OK. Take it easy,



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