2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

>> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
>> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
> Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
> Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
> large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of
> Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light
> on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful
> representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry.
> The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical
> assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then
> Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough)

I don't know if the question is important, but it interests me.  It's
kind of you to answer, though as I said I didn't expect one here and
> 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the
>> basis of these different assumptions?
> Hmm...  It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of
> comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps
> coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If
> UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to
> Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow,
> explorations of the matrix. I dunno.
>> 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable,
>> assuming "CTM + PM = false"?
> It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument!  You
> are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks!

Perhaps I phrased this ambiguously.  I meant: if one *assumes* (does
this word carry some additional meaning beyond the hypothetical in
French?) that CTM + PM is indeed false, but one is also prepared to
relinquish CTM, what other theories of mind might be available?  I'm
sorry if this question vexes you ;-)

> UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this:  CTM ->
> not PM,  or this: PM -> ~CTM.
> Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs
> even more mathematical logic. Sorry.
> 1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the
> propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is
> non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases.
> 2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that
> you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models
> of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no
> more complete.  You have to add a formula to characterize them.
> 3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be
> completed.
> 4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are
> very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not
> collapsing actually.
>> 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation =
>> substitution" have any force outside CTM?
> I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am
> not sure what you refer to.

I refer to the next sentence.  Patience!

>> IOW if I believe I'm made
>> of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating
>> proposals from the doctor?
> If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you
> will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person.
> If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory
> of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in
> any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors
> (the QM-Copenhagen).
>> ....and so forth.
>> Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the
>> discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved.
> If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the
> point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and
> CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in
> step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is
> ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means
> Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be
> applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of
> CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists.
> UDA would loss its main purpose!
> I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that
> they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is
> false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it
> *is* an epistemological contradiction).
> Too bad for them. OK? The rationalist loves to search errors and
> criticize reasoning. I have decompose the reasoning in step to provide
> helps, but dogmatic person seems not to take the opportunity. I guess
> CTM+PM is a sort of "religious" dogma, for them.
> And they are never clear on PM. Somehow they cannot be clear, because
> if they are too much clear, Church thesis entails that comp + a level
> low enough will "generate the appearance of that PM". This why Peter
> is nervous with the idea that PM is really what is relatively
> contingent in the arithmetical context. "PM" exists but with comp it
> is just "M".
> Now David, if you have any trouble with UDA, as you seem to have
> sometimes, I can help, and I am certainly open to the idea that things
> are still unclear, or even that, who knows, a fatal error is hidden.

Thanks, your help is most welcome, and my understanding is no doubt
imperfect.  But sometimes I think you suspect that I misunderstand UDA
because of hypothetical examples I propose precisely to show the
faulty implications of a position that I'm *questioning*, not
supporting.  I'm sorry if it isn't always clear to you when this is my

> But since the time, I doubt it. Some reluctance to Platonism  is just
> normal, given history, but also a natural fear that all Lobian machine
> can have in front of their ignorance.
> Note that many in this list have still problem with step-8, and that
> is why I have begun to do the "step seven" with the math in details,
> to get a better understanding of what happens in step 8, and what is
> computational supervenience. The math is counter-intuitive.
> Computerland is wonderland!

I don't have a problem with step 8 on the basis of the Olympia
argument, as I've tried to demonstrate - is there some other aspect of
computational supervenience that you feel I'm missing?

> May be you don't want to do the math? The math for UDA are really
> basic compared to the math needed for AUDA.

I'm trying to follow the math as you go through it, although I still
haven't really fathomed where it's leading.

> But that's OK. Take it easy,
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >

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