2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: >> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates >> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity? > > Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question. > Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a > large spectrum of consideration, and it leads naturally to the use of > Computer science, which is full of interesting result which put light > on those question. In the process you try to find the faithful > representations to reason correct at the relevant level of your inquiry. > The advantage of comp is that you can get a lot, without theoretical > assumptions (other that yes doctor and some high school math, and then > Church thesis, virtually accepted by everybody, curiously enough)
I don't know if the question is important, but it interests me. It's kind of you to answer, though as I said I didn't expect one here and now. > 2) How do explanations of physical and mental phenomena diverge on the >> basis of these different assumptions? > > Hmm... It depends of the future. If UDA leads to a refutation of > comp, it will lead to non computationalist theory of mind, perhaps > coherent with physicalism (I don't know, I doubt this actually). If > UDA leads to a empirically correct physics, it will leads to > Pythagorean second birth and probably the slow, or not so slow, > explorations of the matrix. I dunno. > >> 3) What kind of non-computational theories of mind might be viable, >> assuming "CTM + PM = false"? > > It is a bit vexing that you assume the result of a an argument! You > are assuming UDA is valid. Thanks! Perhaps I phrased this ambiguously. I meant: if one *assumes* (does this word carry some additional meaning beyond the hypothetical in French?) that CTM + PM is indeed false, but one is also prepared to relinquish CTM, what other theories of mind might be available? I'm sorry if this question vexes you ;-) > UDA shows that CTM + PM -> false. Equivalently, it shows this: CTM -> > not PM, or this: PM -> ~CTM. > > Non computational theory of mind? There are three kinds. But it needs > even more mathematical logic. Sorry. > 1) Those for which AUDA still works completely and soundly, at the > propositional level. Most self-referentially correct "angels", that is > non turing emulable entities still obeys to the AUDA hypostases. > 2) Those for which AUDA remains sound, but no more complete, but that > you can effectively complete (example: true in all transitive models > of ZF). G and G* are still sound for such a "divine" entity, but no > more complete. You have to add a formula to characterize them. > 3) Those for which AUDA could apply soundly, but can no more be > completed. > 4) Those for which AUDA does no more apply at all. I suspect they are > very "near" the "0-person" ONE itself, but the math are hard, if not > collapsing actually. > >> 4) And my original question: does the notion of "emulation = >> substitution" have any force outside CTM? > > I have too many interpretations for "emulation = substitution". I am > not sure what you refer to. I refer to the next sentence. Patience! > >> IOW if I believe I'm made >> of primitive matter, what does this imply in terms of evaluating >> proposals from the doctor? > > If the doctor proposes a digital machine, and you accept, it means you > will either become zombie, or a non working zombie, or a dead person. > If he propose a non digital machine coherent with your non comp theory > of mind, it will be OK, but such theory have not yet been proposed in > any rationalist frame. Except in a sense Roger Penrose, and precursors > (the QM-Copenhagen). > > >> >> ....and so forth. >> >> Anyway, it would be nice to get past an impasse which has plagued the >> discussions interminably whilst continually failing to be resolved. > > If Peter is really interested in the subject he could search for the > point where he has trouble in the UDA. But he seems to defend PM and > CTM a priori, so we can't help. He want believe that the problem is in > step 0, where I would assume Platonism at the start. But he is > ambiguous about what he means by Platonism. In some post it means > Arithmetical Realism (the banal believe that classical logic can be > applied to the number realm), and in some post it means the falsity of > CTM+PM, like if I was assuming at the start that only numbers exists. > UDA would loss its main purpose! > > I have met other similar person. They believe so much in CTM+PM that > they does not take the time to study the argument that PM+CTM is > false. (well "is false OR eliminate consciousness and the person": it > *is* an epistemological contradiction). > > Too bad for them. OK? The rationalist loves to search errors and > criticize reasoning. I have decompose the reasoning in step to provide > helps, but dogmatic person seems not to take the opportunity. I guess > CTM+PM is a sort of "religious" dogma, for them. > > And they are never clear on PM. Somehow they cannot be clear, because > if they are too much clear, Church thesis entails that comp + a level > low enough will "generate the appearance of that PM". This why Peter > is nervous with the idea that PM is really what is relatively > contingent in the arithmetical context. "PM" exists but with comp it > is just "M". > > Now David, if you have any trouble with UDA, as you seem to have > sometimes, I can help, and I am certainly open to the idea that things > are still unclear, or even that, who knows, a fatal error is hidden. Thanks, your help is most welcome, and my understanding is no doubt imperfect. But sometimes I think you suspect that I misunderstand UDA because of hypothetical examples I propose precisely to show the faulty implications of a position that I'm *questioning*, not supporting. I'm sorry if it isn't always clear to you when this is my intention. > But since the time, I doubt it. Some reluctance to Platonism is just > normal, given history, but also a natural fear that all Lobian machine > can have in front of their ignorance. > Note that many in this list have still problem with step-8, and that > is why I have begun to do the "step seven" with the math in details, > to get a better understanding of what happens in step 8, and what is > computational supervenience. The math is counter-intuitive. > Computerland is wonderland! I don't have a problem with step 8 on the basis of the Olympia argument, as I've tried to demonstrate - is there some other aspect of computational supervenience that you feel I'm missing? > > May be you don't want to do the math? The math for UDA are really > basic compared to the math needed for AUDA. > I'm trying to follow the math as you go through it, although I still haven't really fathomed where it's leading. > But that's OK. Take it easy, > > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
