On 19 Aug, 21:49, Jesse Mazer <laserma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> > Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
> > Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> > From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
> > On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > 009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>
> > > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
> > > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware".  The
> > > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
> > > >> *any* human concept is *eliminable*
>
> > > > No, reducible, not eliminable. That is an important distinction.
>
> > > Not in this instance.  The whole thrust of the paraphrase argument is
> > > precisely to show - in principle at least - that the reduced concept
> > > can be *eliminated* from the explanation.  You can do this with
> > > 'life', so you should be prepared to do it with 'computation'.
>
> > Showing that a word can be removed from a verbal formulation
> > by substitution with s synonym is not *ontological* elimination.
>
> Of course it is--*according to the Quinean definition of ontology*. The 
> strange thing about your mode of argument is that you talk as though a word 
> like "existence" has some single true correct meaning, and that anyone who 
> uses it differently is just wrong--do you disagree with the basic premise 
> that the meaning of words is defined solely by usage and/or definitions? If 
> so, do you agree that there are in fact different ways this word is defined 
> by real people, even if we restrict our attention to the philosophical 
> community?

Note that I actually argued the point that paraphrase is not
elimination

> Provided you agree with that, your posts would be a lot less confusing if you 
> would distinguish between different definitions and state which one you meant 
> at a given time--for example, one might say "I agree numbers have Quinean 
> existence but I think they lack material existence, or existence in the sense 
> that intelligent beings that appear in mathematical universes are actually 
> conscious beings with their own qualia".
We might call these three notions of existence Q-existence, M-
existence and C-existence for short. My argument with you has been
that even if one wishes to postulate a single universe, M-existence is
an unnecessary middleman and doesn't even seem well-defined, all we
need to do is postulate that out of all the mathematically possible
universes that have Q-existence, only one has C-existence.

The M-existence hypothesis is supported by the whole of science, and,
unlike the C-existence hypothesis, is in line
with the scientific claim that there was a long period when there was
no consciousness in the universe.
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