On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > > OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal
> > > activity.
> > But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA
> > proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is
> > implausible to justify the ascription of computation to zero physical
> > activity, if you still want to claim that there is computation 'going
> > on', then it can't be attached to physical activity. Are you
> > questioning that MGA constitutes a valid instantiation of a physical
> > TM? What about Olympia?
> I should have added that you can;t have computaton with zero
> computational activity.
One more time then, using Olympia as the reductio ad absurdum: this
relies on radical minimisation of physical activity to render
implausible the notion of the attachment of instantiation-invariant
consciousness-as-computation to PM. AFAICS the way to show that it
did not go through would consist either in denying that Olympia
constitutes a valid physical TM, or by denying the absurdity of the
conclusion: i.e. insisting that any activity, however minimised,
remains fully sufficient for the attachment of a unique, invariant
conscious state. Which is it?
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