On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > > > OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal > > > activity. > > > But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA > > proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is > > implausible to justify the ascription of computation to zero physical > > activity, if you still want to claim that there is computation 'going > > on', then it can't be attached to physical activity. Are you > > questioning that MGA constitutes a valid instantiation of a physical > > TM? What about Olympia? > > I should have added that you can;t have computaton with zero > computational activity.
One more time then, using Olympia as the reductio ad absurdum: this relies on radical minimisation of physical activity to render implausible the notion of the attachment of instantiation-invariant consciousness-as-computation to PM. AFAICS the way to show that it did not go through would consist either in denying that Olympia constitutes a valid physical TM, or by denying the absurdity of the conclusion: i.e. insisting that any activity, however minimised, remains fully sufficient for the attachment of a unique, invariant conscious state. Which is it? David --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---