On 20 Aug, 02:23, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> > On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
> >> is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
> >> - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
> >> rigorous spelling out in physical terms for every conceptual
> >> reduction. MGA claims to show that this is impossible for the
> >> conjunction of CTM and PM. Of course, CTM on the basis of
> >> arithmetical realism is not spelled out either, but is immunised from
> >> physical paraphrase by making no appeal to PM for justification.
> > Err. yeah. The hard part is reducing mentation to computation.
> > The physical paraphrase of computation is just engineering,
> >> I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your
> >> defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on "CTM +PM = true".
> >> Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim?
> > OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal
> > activity.
> But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA
> proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is
> implausible to justify the ascription of computation to zero physical
> activity, if you still want to claim that there is computation 'going
> on', then it can't be attached to physical activity.
I don't; want to claim there is computation still going on
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