On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:

> 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
> by something else that does
> 2. I ontologically exist
> 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
> 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
> Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
> to here

  5. But the UD exists only mathematically.

Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence.

> There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
> of mathematics.

For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a  
general mathematical agreement. There may be no philosophical  
argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non philosophical  

> You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
> and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
> and defending Platonism and other approaches?

Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something  
far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all  
mathematicians agree. It is believed explcitly by many physicists too,  
like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics.

>> By comp, the  ontic
>> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can
>> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson Arithmetic
>> is already enough.
> I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.

This may be the root of your problem.

>> comp = CTM.
> It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
> your SANE paper.

All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 =  4".

> Classical logic is just a formal rule.

It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In  
computer science people admit that a running program will either halt,  
or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of  
classical logic.

> Bivalence is not Platonism

Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully  
"arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and  
Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology).

> So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the
> alternatives
> to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still
> *probably* correct.

You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material.

>> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the
>> issue.
> What issue?

CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible.



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