On 22 Aug 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is
>> part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is
>> Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is
>> not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned.
> That's what makes the point interesting.  Many, even most,
> materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally
> identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a
> brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be
> Turing-emulable.  I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed
> to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation.

Do you agree that this, not only entails the falsity of CTM  
(computationalist theory of mind), but also on any computationalist  
theory of matter.

Your consciousness has to be related to a non computable physical  
process, in actuality. Quantum computer would not be universal in  
Deutsch sense.

I am OK, with this. My point is not to convince people that comp is  
correct, but only that comp makes physics "coming from number dreams",  
to be short.

Saying "no" to the doctor, is your right (even your comp justifiable  
right), but relatively to the reasoning it is equivalent with stopping  
at step zero.

So now, your mind is free to look if the reasoning is valid. No worry  
with the uncomfortable consequences, given that you don't believe in  
the initial axiom. Right?

Well, you may be not interested in the consequence of a theory in  
which you don't believe, but you may be intrigued.

Unless you believe the comp hypothesis is inconsistent? I don't think  
you believe this either.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to