Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Aug 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is >>> part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is >>> Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is >>> not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned. >> That's what makes the point interesting. Many, even most, >> materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally >> identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a >> brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be >> Turing-emulable. I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed >> to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation. > > > OK. > Do you agree that this, not only entails the falsity of CTM > (computationalist theory of mind), but also on any computationalist > theory of matter.
Yes, so long as by "computation" you mean only the Church-Turing definitions of computation. > > Your consciousness has to be related to a non computable physical > process, in actuality. Quantum computer would not be universal in > Deutsch sense. > > I am OK, with this. My point is not to convince people that comp is > correct, but only that comp makes physics "coming from number dreams", > to be short. > > Saying "no" to the doctor, is your right (even your comp justifiable > right), but relatively to the reasoning it is equivalent with stopping > at step zero. > > So now, your mind is free to look if the reasoning is valid. No worry > with the uncomfortable consequences, given that you don't believe in > the initial axiom. Right? > > Well, you may be not interested in the consequence of a theory in > which you don't believe, but you may be intrigued. I am interested. I don't believe or disbelieve. Maybe the "generalized brain" is Turing emulable. I'm just not nearly so confident that it is as I am that my brain is emulable. > > Unless you believe the comp hypothesis is inconsistent? I don't think > you believe this either. Not inconsistent; but I have considerable empathy with Peter's view. My general attitude is that "exist" is just a word to name a concept we invent and we can invent different kinds of existence: physical it-kicks-back existence, mathematical it's-provable-from-axioms existence, etc. I may not agree that arithmetic is what's really real, but I regard your theory as an interesting model and I hope it leads to predicting something we don't know. Brent > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---