Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 22 Aug 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is
>>> part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is
>>> Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is
>>> not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned.
>> That's what makes the point interesting.  Many, even most,
>> materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally
>> identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a
>> brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be
>> Turing-emulable.  I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed
>> to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation.
> OK.
> Do you agree that this, not only entails the falsity of CTM  
> (computationalist theory of mind), but also on any computationalist  
> theory of matter.

Yes, so long as by "computation" you mean only the Church-Turing 
definitions of computation.

> Your consciousness has to be related to a non computable physical  
> process, in actuality. Quantum computer would not be universal in  
> Deutsch sense.
> I am OK, with this. My point is not to convince people that comp is  
> correct, but only that comp makes physics "coming from number dreams",  
> to be short.
> Saying "no" to the doctor, is your right (even your comp justifiable  
> right), but relatively to the reasoning it is equivalent with stopping  
> at step zero.
> So now, your mind is free to look if the reasoning is valid. No worry  
> with the uncomfortable consequences, given that you don't believe in  
> the initial axiom. Right?
> Well, you may be not interested in the consequence of a theory in  
> which you don't believe, but you may be intrigued.

I am interested.  I don't believe or disbelieve.  Maybe the 
"generalized brain" is Turing emulable.  I'm just not nearly so 
confident that it is as I am that my brain is emulable.

> Unless you believe the comp hypothesis is inconsistent? I don't think  
> you believe this either.

Not inconsistent; but I have considerable empathy with Peter's view. 
My general attitude is that "exist" is just a word to name a concept 
we invent and we can invent different kinds of existence: physical 
it-kicks-back existence, mathematical it's-provable-from-axioms 
existence, etc.  I may not agree that arithmetic is what's really 
real, but I regard your theory as an interesting model and I hope it 
leads to predicting something we don't know.


> Bruno

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