2009/8/27 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>:

> There's something trickier here, too.  When you say "unless you are
> the system", this masks an implicit - and dualistic - assumption in
> addition to PM monism.  It is axiomatic that any properly monistic
> materialist account must hold all properties of a system to be
> extrinsic, and hence capable of *exhaustive* extrinsic formulation.
> IOW if it's not extrinsically describable, it doesn't exist in terms
> of PM.  So what possible difference could it make, under this
> restriction, to 'be' the system?  If the reply is that it makes just
> the somewhat epoch-making difference of conjuring up an otherwise
> unknowable world of qualitative experience, can we still lay claim to
> a monistic ontology, in any sense that doesn't beggar the term?

Perhaps not, but it's just words. Materialists use "dualism" as a term
of abuse, and some materialists will call anyone who thinks a lot
about consciousness a dualist, while some of those who think a lot
about consciousness will do anything to avoid being called that.

Stathis Papaioannou

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