On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:

> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
>> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
>> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
>> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy, but
>> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory (and
>> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the universe
>> predicted by comp).
>> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make the
>> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-of- 
>> the
>> gaps") use of matter.
> No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
> supervenes
> directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation can
> be conscious.

But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that setting,  
nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness supervenes  
*directly* on matter".
I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to have  
consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real  
material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes  
epistemologically inconsistant.

> That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument that
> "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"

We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is computable"  
which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.
And we have that "physics is computable" entails CTM is false (because  
by UDA, CTM entails that physics cannot be entirely computable, and it  
is an open problem if that non computability comes only from what is  
contingent in the computational histories). The white rabbit can be  
made *relatively* rare (in QM, or in comp) but can never disappear.



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