On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
> > On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
> >> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
> >> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
> >> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
> >> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy, but
> >> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory (and
> >> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the universe
> >> predicted by comp).
> >> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make the
> >> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-of-
> >> the
> >> gaps") use of matter.
> > No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
> > supervenes
> > directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation can
> > be conscious.
> OK.
> But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that setting,  
> nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness supervenes  
> *directly* on matter".
> I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to have  
> consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real  
> material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes  
> epistemologically inconsistant.
> > That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument that
> > "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"
> We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is computable"  
> which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.

No we don't for the reasons given.

> And we have that "physics is computable" entails CTM is false (because  
> by UDA, CTM entails that physics cannot be entirely computable, and it  
> is an open problem if that non computability comes only from what is  
> contingent in the computational histories). The white rabbit can be  
> made *relatively* rare (in QM, or in comp) but can never disappear.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to