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On 21 Aug, 20:49, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 21 Aug 2009, at 09:33, Flammarion wrote: > > > > > > > On 20 Aug, 00:28, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote: > > >>> Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process > >>> at > >>> all. I don't see any evidence for that > > >> I am explaining this right now. > > >>> Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter. > > >> The notion of computation and computability have been discovered by > >> Mathematicians working around the foundation crisis of math after the > >> discovery by Cantor and others of paradoxes in set theory. > > >> The idea is that computation should be redefined as physical > >> computation is a very recent one, and is due to people like David > >> Deustch and Landauer. And it does not really work as such. Deutsch > >> "reconstruction" of the Post-Church-Turing thesis is really a > >> different thesis. > > > Of course you can have theoretical > > truths about computation > > > But show me something that has been computed by > > an immaterial computer. > > A Schmidhuberian computationalist would probably answer: look around > you. But I have explained why this is not enough, and why a prori comp > makes the observable reality not the output of one program (but a view > from inside from all execution of all programs). > > I can only hope you will work on the UDA+MGA, and understand that > "non-theoretical" truth have to be redefined as theoretical > possibilities (consistencies) observed from inside (from some first > person point of view). There is no UD. > Comp, or CTM, leads to a "many types no token" view of reality. Token > are seen as such by being appearances from the point of view of an > abstract subject coupled to an (infinity of) abstract computations. > > > > >>> CTM *implies* materialism, and the MGA doesn't work. > > >> CTM is neutral on materialism, even if many materialist use > >> incorrectly comp to put the mind body problem under the rug. UDA, > >> including MGA, shows why this fails. > > >> What is in MGA which does not work? > > > It's a reductio of the idea that mental states > > supervene on computational states. > > CTM must be cast as the claim > > that mental activity supervenes on computational > > activity. > > I agree. Consciousness is attached to computation (and not to > computational states), even at the starting of the reasoning, and also > when the physical supervenience is introduced in MGA for the reductio > ad absurdum. > Then, eventually, keeping CTM, and thus abandoning (weak) materialism, > consciousness is related to, well not just a computation, but to an > infinite sheaves of computations. Consciousness is a first person > notion, and as such, is dependent on the first person uncertainty > measure brought by the first person indeterminacy. > This is why I take time to explain what is a computation, or a > computational activity, in purely arithmetical terms. A computation is > not "just" a sequence of computational states, it is a sequence of > computational states related by at least one universal machine (and > then an infinity of them, from the point of view of the conscious > being, observably so when he/she looks below its substitution level). > Classical physics become the study of our most probable computations, > which emerge from the statistical interference of all computations > going through my relevant states (the relevance being dependent of the > observer's comp-substitution level). > > >> Thanks for quoting my sane2004 definition of comp, and showing that > >> indeed platonism is not part of it. > > > "It is a version of Platonism" > > The wording is not important. Maybe you could flag the wording that we are supposed to take serioulsy. > The point is that in the assumption of > CTM, (CT+ the theological act of faith), I am using that "version of > platonism" only, which is just the idea that classical logic can be > applied to arithmetical sentences, and in the conclusion, only, we > have to abandon weak materialism or CTM. Nope. Assumptions about truth don't get you a UD which is capable of simulating me. You need a claim about existence. You argument is either based on Platonism or invalid > >> Just arithmetical realism without which CT has no meaning at all. > > > The CT thesis requires some mathematical > > claims to be true. it doesn't require numbers to actually exist > > I have never asserted that numbers actually exist. Just that they > exist in the sense of the usual interpretation of existential > arithmetical statement are independent of me, you, or the existence or > not of a material world. There is no usual interpretation, it is disputed. Formalists don't think backeards-E has any existential implications at all > Would the two cosmic branes never have collided, and the big bang > never occurred, the Rieman hypothesis would still be atemporally and > aspatially true or false. Truth and falsehood don't buy you an immaterial computer simulating me and eveything I see. > >> Get the feeling you have change your mind on AR. You believe that a > >> proposition like the statement that there is no biggest prime number > >> has something to do with physics. In which physical theory you prove > >> that statement, and how? > > > Its truth is not a physical truth. The existence or non-existence > > asserted is not any kind of real existence > > OK, in your theory "real existence" = "physical existence". There are two claim here: "real existence" = "physical existence". and "mathemaical existence" != "real existence". they are argued separately. > But if the > UDA is valid it would be better to write "consensual reality" = > "physical reality", and ontic or basic 3- existence = arithmetical > existence, or to abandon CTM. If UDA is non valid, it would be nice to > point where is the error. You said that the error is in step 0, > because I would have pretended something like "the number seven > actually exists". My answer is that I don't see where I say so. I just > say that the number seven exists, in the sense used by mathematicians. > I limit my "platonism" to arithmetic to avoid the problem of > "platonism" in set theory or analysis, and the CTM explains why > realism on natural numbers in both necessary and sufficient. > > > I am not denying nay truths, only the interpretation of backwards-E > > as actual existence > > I am using a fairly common notion of mathematical existence, There is no common notion, the ontology of maths is not a settled issue > and I > explain that once you say yes to the doctor, the notion of physical > existence has to be reduced to that common notion of mathematical > existence (actually a tiny part of arithmetical existence). > > Up to now, the only things you criticize in the UD reasoning are > things *you* are introducing, In the sense that your Platonism is largley implict, and needs to be made explicit.. >and when I remark to you that it is not > there, you say, it is implicit, but fail to show me where those > implicit statement have been used. Then you change the meaning of > "platonism" at every post. You define a criterium of "real" (RITSIAR) > without ever saying if the "I" is the third person body (which we can > doubt the existence) or the first person consciousness (which we > cannot doubt, but can't communicate). >From the materialist POV, the difference isn't important. >You said that the difference is > epistemological, but that does not answer the question. > You said once that you accept mathematical truth, and then that the > number seven does not exist AT ALL. YES!!!!! IT IS A WELL KNOWN POSITION CALLED FORMALISM!!!!! It is not some absurdity I just invented. > You compare mathematical object with fictional character in fairy > tales! That's another well-know position called ficitonalism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ >Do you really think that an arithmetician could write "Once > upon a time there was an odd number dreaming becoming an even > number ...". That isn't what I wrote. What I wrote was that there are sentences which are a) true and b) mention the word "exists" but in which "exsts" is not meant to be taken literally. > It would help much more if you were able to say "I don't understand > this or that in the reasoning, and give explicit reference to the > paper or posts". The argumetn I am actually making is that your arguemnt is either invalid or has an imiplict premise. How am I supposed ot point to an implicit premise. > I would be pleased if you could stop to attribute me more than I make > explicit. Comp is perhaps just a more precise and much more weak > assumption than usual CTM theory which usually put the comp level very > high. Comp is a weak precise form of CTM. And yes, I do believe that 2 > + 2 = 4, and that 7 is prime. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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