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On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote: > > > 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated > > by something else that does > > 2. I ontologically exist > > 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD > > 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist. > > > Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards > > to here > > 5. But the UD exists only mathematically. > > Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence. > > > There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology > > of mathematics. > > For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a > general mathematical agreement. No there isn't. >There may be no philosophical > argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non philosophical > reasoning. Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons with mathematical proofs. > > You are aware. are you not, that philosophers > > and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking > > and defending Platonism and other approaches? > > Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something > far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all > mathematicians agree. I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist. The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard ontology. >It is believed explcitly by many physicists too, > like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics. I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious, therefore it is needs jsutification. > >> By comp, the ontic > >> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can > >> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson Arithmetic > >> is already enough. > > > I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist. > > This may be the root of your problem. > > >> comp = CTM. > > > It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in > > your SANE paper. > > All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4". > Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD > > Classical logic is just a formal rule. > > It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In > computer science people admit that a running program will either halt, > or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of > classical logic. > It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers no-one has built. > > Bivalence is not Platonism > > Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully > "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and > Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology). Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua existence. > > So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the > > alternatives > > to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still > > *probably* correct. > > You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material. I am telling you I do not have to give equal weight to every hypothesis. > >> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the > >> issue. > > > What issue? > > CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible. Not demonstrated. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---