On 22 Aug, 08:21, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote:
>
> > 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated
> > by something else that does
> > 2. I ontologically exist
> > 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD
> > 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist.
>
> > Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards
> > to here
>
>   5. But the UD exists only mathematically.
>
> Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence.
>
> > There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology
> > of mathematics.
>
> For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a
> general mathematical agreement.

No there isn't.

>There may be no philosophical
> argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non philosophical
> reasoning.

Ontology is philosophy. You can't settle ontological quesitons
with mathematical proofs.

> > You are aware. are you not, that philosophers
> > and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking
> > and defending Platonism and other approaches?
>
> Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something
> far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all
> mathematicians agree.

I am not concerned with argument about how many pixies exist.

The point remains: there *is* a debate so there is *not* a standard
ontology.

>It is believed explcitly by many physicists too,
> like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics.

I never said no-on beliieves Platonism. I said some
people belive other things. Therefore it is contentious,
therefore it is needs jsutification.

> >> By comp, the  ontic
> >> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can
> >> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson Arithmetic
> >> is already enough.
>
> > I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist.
>
> This may be the root of your problem.
>
> >> comp = CTM.
>
> > It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in
> > your SANE paper.
>
> All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 =  4".
>
Nope, mere truth does not buy the immaterial existence of a UD

> > Classical logic is just a formal rule.
>
> It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In
> computer science people admit that a running program will either halt,
> or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of
> classical logic.
>
It still does not demonstrate the immaterial existence of computers
no-one has built.

> > Bivalence is not Platonism
>
> Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully
> "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and
> Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology).

Even more reason to distinguish between AR qua truth and AR qua
existence.

> > So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the
> > alternatives
> > to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still
> > *probably* correct.
>
> You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material.

I am telling you I do not have to give equal weight to
every hypothesis.

> >> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the
> >> issue.
>
> > What issue?
>
> CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible.

Not demonstrated.
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to