Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>:
>>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
>>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
>>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
>> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
>> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
> If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
> aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
> independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
> 2 different physical process could generate the same computation
> without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
> processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
> thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
> Regards,
> Quentin

Try substituting "lengths" for "computations".  Are lengths primary 
because the same length can occur in different physical objects?


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