Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
> 
>>
>>
>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
>>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
>>> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
>>> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
>>> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy, but
>>> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory (and
>>> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the universe
>>> predicted by comp).
>>>
>>> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make the
>>> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-of- 
>>> the
>>> gaps") use of matter.
>> No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
>> supervenes
>> directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation can
>> be conscious.
> 
> OK.
> But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that setting,  
> nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness supervenes  
> *directly* on matter".
> I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to have  
> consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real  
> material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes  
> epistemologically inconsistant.
> 
> 
>> That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument that
>> "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"
> 
> 
> We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is computable"  
> which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.
> And we have that "physics is computable" entails CTM is false (because  
> by UDA, CTM entails that physics cannot be entirely computable, 

This seems to already assume that physics and computation are the same 
kind of thing, i.e. physics is in Platonia or CTM is a statement about 
real machines.

>and it  
> is an open problem if that non computability comes only from what is  
> contingent in the computational histories). 

Is the contingency of the form some things happen and some things don't?

Brent

>The white rabbit can be  
> made *relatively* rare (in QM, or in comp) but can never disappear.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> 


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